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This thesis investigates whether the corporate governance has an effect on the level 
of earnings management (as measured by income-increasing and income-decreasing 
discretionary current accruals). In particular, we examine the relationship between 
characteristics of the board/audit committee and earnings management with a sample 
of large, publicly-traded UK firms.  
 
We find that the independence of the board from management is negatively related to 
the level of income-increasing earnings management. The average tenure of non-
executive directors and the board meeting frequency also contribute to a reduction in 
the level of earnings management. In contrast, we find little evidence that the 
independence and financial expertise of audit committees constrain the level of 
earnings management, and only the audit committee meeting frequency shows 
negative association with income-decreasing earnings management. Our findings 
suggest that the board of directors and audit committee may constrain earnings 
management activities, and provide implications researchers and regulators. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Reported earnings powerfully influence a firm’s full range of business activities and 
its management decisions. Earnings could affect investors’ evaluations of a firm, 
impact its financial leverage or determine the compensation of managers. To 
maintain the earnings at the desirable level, managers have a strong incentive to 
adjust earnings figures. Furthermore, the flexibility of general accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) provides managers with considerable ability to manipulate 
accounting earnings. Thus， the practice of management using judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter earnings emerges and this is known 
as “earnings management” [Healy and Wahlen (1999)]. 
 
Earnings manipulation has drawn the serious attention of regulators, the financial 
press and academic research. For example, at the NYU Center of Law and Business 
Conference in 1998, Arthur Levitt, the Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commissions (SEC) at the time, expressed his great concern over the adverse effects 
of earnings management on the US capital market. In his speech, he claimed 
earnings management impaired the reliability of financial reporting and weakened 
investors’ confidence, and he urged the SEC to be committed to taking serious action 
against earnings management. Hence, how to constrain the adverse effects of 
earnings management and improve the quality of financial reporting are very critical 
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issues. 
 
The board of directors and the audit committee play a crucial role in restraining 
earnings management in a firm. They are responsible for monitoring managers on 
behalf of shareholders and overseeing the financial reporting process. However, the 
boards of directors of public firms are generally considered as passive entities which 
are controlled by management. Many corporate governance reports [Blue Ribbon 
Committee (BRC) Report 1999, the Cadbury Report (1992), the Combined Code 
(1998), and the revised Combined Code (2003)] proposed “best practice” 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the board of directors and the audit 
committee. More recently, pursuant to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, 
the SEC and the stock exchanges in the U.S. introduced requirements for a majority 
of the board of directors to be independent of management, tightened considerably 
the definition of independence, and required the audit committee to be comprised 
entirely of independent directors who are financially literate and with at least one 
member being a financial expert. The objective of this thesis is to empirically 
examine the effects of some of the “best practices” by studying how the board of 
directors and audit committees affect the level of earnings management.  
 
This thesis examines the relation between certain attributes of the board and audit 
committee, and earnings management. The attributes studied here are the proportion 
of outside directors, the competence of outside directors, their compensation 
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schemes and the activities of the board and audit committee. Earnings management 
is measured as discretionary current accruals which are estimated from the Modified 
Jones Model. The manager’s incentive to manipulate earnings around certain targets 
is also taken into consideration. This research is conducted with a sample of large, 
publicly-traded UK firms, since the board/audit committee characteristics of UK 
firms are more diverse than those of US firms. 
 
The results of this thesis show that some board characteristics are related to the level 
of earnings management. Outside directors on the board help to restrain a manager’s 
earnings management behavior when unmanaged earnings are in the loss position. 
When the unmanaged earnings are less than those of the previous year, a 
combination of the roles of CEO and Chairman in the same person as well as the 
extra compensation of outside directors is positively related to the level of earnings 
management. In addition, higher average tenure of outside directors and higher 
frequency of board meetings contribute to a reduction in the level of earnings 
management. The above results, except those on tenure, are supportive of the 
recommendations of the UK Combined Code.  
 
In addition, there is little evidence that the board of directors constrains the income-
decreasing earnings management when unmanaged earnings already exceed the 
targets. Further, the independence and financial expertise of audit committees do not 
have significant associations with the level of earnings management. Finally, more 
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frequent audit committee meetings reduce income-decreasing earnings management 
when unmanaged earnings are higher than those of the previous year. 
 
By selecting UK firms for analysis, this study could enrich the literature on the 
relationship between board monitoring and financial reporting. To date, most studies 
in this field have been US-based, while only a few have provided evidence from the 
UK, e.g., Song and Windram (2004), Peasnell et al (2000), and Peasnell et al (2005). 
Song and Windram (2004) find some links between the board and audit 
characteristics and violations of accounting standards, by using a sample of 
companies which were identified by the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) 
for publishing defective financial statements. Unlike Song and Windram (2004), 
Peasnell et al (2000) and Peasnell et al (2005) study board and audit committee 
monitoring on earnings management which is within the boundary of GAAP, but 
they focus only on the effects of two characteristics, board independence and audit 
committee existence. This thesis is a more comprehensive study on the effects of 
various characteristics of the board/audit committee on earnings management. 
 
This study also extends the research on board effectiveness by including the 
compensation of the directors as a determinant. It is likely that the performance of a 
director varies, depending on how they are compensated. However, few previous 
studies have taken such financial motivation of the non-executive directors into 
consideration. The results of this study show that the directors who are not receiving 
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any extra benefits from the company or who are holding more shares are more 
capable of constraining earnings management. Such results may be helpful to the 
company in designing more effective compensation packages for non-executive 
directors.  
 
The remaining chapters of this paper are organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an 
overview of corporate governance in the UK and reviews the literature on earnings 
management and corporate governance. Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses to be 
tested. Chapter 4 discusses the data sources and describes research methodology. 
Chapter 5 presents and discusses the results of the empirical analyses, and Chapter 6 
summarizes the results and draws conclusions. It also makes recommendations for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN THE UK 
 
2.1 Review of literature on earnings management 
In contrast to accounting frauds which violate Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP), opportunities for earnings management are inherent in the 
current financial reporting system. Within the boundaries of GAAP, managers have 
several avenues to manipulate earnings. They can choose an accounting method to 
either advance or delay the recognition of revenues and expenses, use discretion 
relating to the application of the chosen accounting method, or adjust the timing of 
asset acquisitions and dispositions to alter reported earnings [Teoh et al (1998a)]. Xie 
et al (2003) argue that the nature of accrual accounting offers managers considerable 
discretion in determining earnings in any given period. Since earnings management 
has drawn significant attention from regulators, the financial press and academic 
research, there have been many studies on this topic which mainly focus on 
incentives of earnings management and consequences of such behavior. 
 
2.1.1 Incentives of earnings management 
Various incentives can induce managers to manipulate earnings. Some incentives 
may be provided by contractual arrangements (management compensation, debt and 
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dividend covenants, etc) based on accounting earnings because it is likely to be 
costly for shareholders and creditors to detect earnings management [Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978)]. Both Healy and Palepu (1990) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (1992) conclude that there is little evidence of earnings management among 
firms close to their dividend covenant. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that 
sample firms accelerate earnings prior to breaking lending covenants. Healy (1985) 
shows that firms with caps on bonus plans are more likely to defer income when the 
cap is already reached, compared to firms without caps on bonus plans. DeAngelo 
(1988) finds that managers tend to manipulate earnings upwards during a proxy 
contest.  Cornett et al (2005) find that option-based compensation of managers 
strongly encourages earnings management. The above empirical results suggest that 
the lending contracts and management compensation contracts provide incentives for 
at least some firms to manage earnings. 
 
In some cases, earnings management is motivated by regulatory considerations. 
Previous studies show strong evidence that managers would manipulate earnings to 
circumvent industry regulations. For example, Moyer (1990), Scholes et al (1990) 
and Beatty et al (1995) find that banks overstate loan loss provisions and understate 
loan write-offs when they are close to minimum capital requirements.  Reducing the 
risk of an anti-trust investigation or seeking government subsidy is another 
regulatory incentive for earnings management. Cahan (1992) finds that firms under 
anti-trust investigation report income-decreasing abnormal accruals, and Jones (1991) 
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shows that firms seeking import relief manipulate earnings downwards.  
 
Some studies focus more on incentives provided by capital markets. Accounting 
information, such as earnings, is considered so important for the capital market in 
valuing the firm that managers would manipulate earnings to avoid unfavorable 
earnings news [Dechow and Skinner (2000)]. Some studies examine earnings 
management when in the process of undertaking capital market transactions. For 
instance, Teoh et al (1998a, b) and Erickson and Wang (1999) show that firms 
“overstate” earnings prior to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), initial public 
offerings (IPOs) and stock-for-stock mergers in order to receive favorable valuations 
from capital markets.  
 
Several studies of capital markets incentives document that managers have 
incentives to manage earnings to meet certain earnings benchmarks [Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997), Degeorge et al (1999), and Jacob and Jorgensen (2005)]. These 
studies show that the frequency of small positive earnings (positive earnings changes 
or earnings surprise) is higher than expected; while the frequency of small negative 
earnings (negative earnings changes or earnings surprises) is less than expected. 
These results are explained as evidence of managers using income-increasing 
earnings management to avoid reporting losses, earnings declines, or missing 
forecasts of analysts. The reason why meeting such simple benchmarks is so 
important to managers is probably due to the reaction of the capital market. 
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According to Barth et al (1999), firms with continuous earnings growth are priced at 
premium compared to other firms. Skinner and Sloan (2000) find that failure to meet 
analyst earnings forecasts would cause a dramatic drop in stock price for growth 
stocks. Since the personal wealth of top managers is tied more closely to their firms’ 
stock prices in the form of the stock-based compensation plans of recent years, it is 
reasonable to argue that managers have strong incentives to manipulate earnings to 
avoid missing earnings benchmarks. For example, Chen and Warfileld (2005) find 
that firms with high equity incentives (stock options and stock ownership) are more 
likely to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts. 
 
2.1.2 Consequences of earnings management 
Practitioners and regulators often believe that earnings management is pervasive and 
problematic. For example, an article in Loomis (1999) indicates that many CEOs 
believe “making their numbers" is just what executives do, and “the fundamental 
problem with the earnings-management culture-especially when it leads companies 
to cross the line in accounting-is that it obscures facts investors ought to know, 
leaving them in the dark about the true value of a business. That's bad enough when 
times are good”. Former SEC Chairman Levitt (1998) also said that earnings 
management is “a game that, if not addressed soon, will have adverse consequences 
for America's financial reporting system” and become “a game that runs counter to 
the very principles behind our market's strength and success”.   
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Accounting academics have relatively more diverse perceptions of earnings 
management than practitioners and regulators. Some academics argue that earnings 
management could possibly be beneficial by providing a means for management to 
convey their private information on firm performance, and that the effect of earnings 
management on investors can be mitigated if the information cost is low [Schipper 
(1989); Arya et al (2003)]. However, there is a potential danger of wealth loss for 
shareholders when the interests of managers and shareholders are in conflict. Since 
the managers are compensated both explicitly (in terms of salary, bonus, stock option, 
etc) and implicitly (in terms of job security, reputation, etc) depending on the firm’s 
earnings performance, they may conceal the true performance by using earnings 
management to get a higher compensation or to keep their jobs at the expense of 
shareholders. Since 1990, there has been an increase in the proportion of stock-based 
compensation in managers’ remuneration. This increment induces managers to 
manipulate earnings to obtain favorable market valuations. Moreover, earnings 
management widens the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. 
Shareholders normally evaluate the price of stock and make the purchase or sale 
decisions according to earnings figures. If misleading information is provided, 
shareholders may make wrong decisions.  
 
A number of empirical studies examine whether investors can see through earnings 
management, and find some evidence that investors can be “fooled” by earnings 
management. For instance, Teoh et al (1998b) find that IPO issuers who manage 
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earnings aggressively perform relatively badly after the IPO, compared to those who 
manage earnings conservatively. Dechow et al (1996) report a 9% decline in stock 
price for firms that are being investigated by SEC for earnings management, and this 
means that investors realize that the firm’s economic prospects are poorer than 
previously thought. As documented in Barth et al (1999) and Skinner and Sloan 
(2000), only small deviations from earnings benchmarks can result in extreme 
capital market reaction, even though the cost of information to investors is quite low. 
These empirical results suggest that the investors do not fully see through the 
earnings management, and the wealth of outside shareholders can therefore be 
adversely affected by earnings management.  
 
2.1.3 Research design issues in earnings management studies 
According to Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen(1999), the academic 
definitions of earnings management focus on management discretion over earnings, 
and thus how to measure unobservable management discretion is one key element of 
earnings management research. Three approaches are most commonly applied in 
literature: estimating discretionary accruals based on aggregate accruals, estimating 
discretionary accruals based on specific accruals and examining the distribution of 
earnings after management. 
 
The aggregate accruals approach is extensively used in earnings management 
literature. According to McNichols (2000), 29 of 56 articles (53%) published in first-
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tier journals from 1993 to 1999 applied this methodology. Healy (1985) uses total 
accruals as proxy for discretionary accruals. DeAngelo (1986) examines earnings 
management by using the change in total accruals. Both the Healy and DeAngelo 
models assume that nondiscretionary accruals are constant over time. However, 
Kaplan (1985) points out that nondiscretionary accruals should fluctuate according 
to the economic circumstances of the firm. Jones (1991) proposes a model which 
relaxes the above assumption. The Jones model tries to estimate discretionary 
accruals as the residual from the regression of total accruals on change in revenue 
and gross property, plant and equipment. Dechow et al (1995) introduce a modified 
version of the Jones model. The modified Jones model adjusts the change in revenue 
for change in net receivables, and thus eliminates the potential measurement error 
when management discretion is exercised over revenue. Among the four models 
described above, the Jones model and the modified Jones model are more widely 
used, as in Teoh et al (1998a&b), Erickson and Wang (1999), Matsumoto (2002) and 
Kothari et al (2005). Dechow et al (1995) also compare the specifications and the 
power of above models. They find that all the models appear well specified for 
random samples of firm-years and the modified Jones model provides the greatest 
power in detecting earnings management among these models. 
 
Some studies have examined earnings management by modeling a specific accrual. 
For example, McNichols and Wilson (1988) use GAAP to estimate discretionary 
component of provision for bad debts and find evidence of income-decreasing 
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earnings management for firms with extremely high or low earnings. Petroni (1992) 
measures the discretionary accrual as an estimation error of the claim loss reserve of 
property casualty insurance firms. Subsequent studies by Beaver and McNichols 
(1998), Penalva (1998) and Nelson (2000) also focus on the loss reserve of casualty 
insurers and find the evidence of earnings management. The main advantage of this 
specific accrual approach is that researchers can better understand the behavior of a 
specific accrual based on GAAP, while the main disadvantage of this approach is 
that the power of the test will be reduced if the management uses accruals other than 
the chosen one to manipulate earnings.  Aware of this disadvantage, most of the 
studies using the specific accrual approach focus on specific industries such as 
banking and insurance, so that the researchers have more institutional knowledge to 
identify the accruals subject to management discretion.  
 
The third approach for detecting earnings management is to examine the distribution 
of reported earnings. Literature on this approach began with Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) and Degeorge et al (1999). These studies hypothesize that managers have 
incentives to avoid missing certain benchmarks such as zero earnings, prior year’s 
earnings and analyst forecast, and hence examine the distribution of reported 
earnings around these benchmarks. Both studies find a higher than expected 
frequency of firms with slightly positive earnings /earnings changes/earnings 
surprise and lower than expected frequency of firms with slightly negative earnings 
/earnings changes/earnings surprise. This pattern of earnings distribution is 
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considered as evidence that earnings are managed to avoid reporting negative 
earnings, earnings declines or negative earnings surprises. The advantage of this 
approach is that it allows researchers to make strong predictions of the existence of 
earnings management around certain benchmarks and to assess the extent of earnings 
management on the economy. However, the distribution approach has its own 
limitations. First, it does not directly examine which approach is applied to 
manipulate earnings. Second, it is unable to help researchers to understand the 
incentives for management to achieve specific benchmarks. 
 
2.2 Review of literature on the board of directors  
The separation of ownership and control is inherent in the modern corporate 
organization. However, this separation also causes an agency problem between 
shareholders (the principals) and management (the agent) [Fama and Jensen (1983)]. 
Since shareholders generally hold more than one kind of security to diversify their 
risks, and the ownership structure of a company is highly dispersed, no individual 
shareholder has enough incentives and resources to ensure that management is acting 
in his or her interest. To control this agency problem, corporate governance, which 
encompasses a set of institutional and market mechanisms, is necessary to induce 
managers with self-interests to maximize the value of the residual cash flows of the 
firm on behalf of its shareholders. 
 
There are four basic corporate governance mechanisms which are identified by 
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Jensen (1993): legal and regulatory mechanism, internal control mechanism, 
corporate take over market and product market competition. Among these corporate 
governance mechanisms, the board of directors is often considered as the primary 
internal control mechanism to monitor top management and to protect the 
shareholders’ interests. For example, Fama (1980) argues that the board of directors 
is a market-induced institution and the ultimate internal monitor of a firm. The most 
important role of the board of directors is to scrutinize the highest decision-makers 
within the firm.  
 
To examine the internal control function of the board of directors, many studies have 
highlighted the relationship between board monitoring and firm value. Board 
monitoring effectiveness is usually measured by board composition, size or board 
meeting frequency, while firm value is measured by economic performance and 
financial performance. The empirical results are mixed. Weisbach (1988) finds that 
firms with outsider-dominated boards are more likely to remove the incompetent 
CEOs than those with insider-dominated boards, after controlling effects of 
ownership, firm size and industry; and the unexpected stock on the date of the 
announcement of CEO resignation supports the view that effective board monitoring 
could increase firm value. Molz (1988) reports that pluralist boards which are 
outsider-dominated, which separate the roles of CEO and Chairman, and which meet 
more frequently, have higher average levels of performance than managerial 
dominated boards. However, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) do not find a 
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statistically significant link between board composition and firm value measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Vafeas (1999) notes that board meeting frequency is negatively related to 
market-to-book ration, a proxy for firm value, while firms experience improvement 
in operating performance (i.e., profitability and asset efficiency) after years of 
abnormal high board meeting frequency, especially those with poor prior operating 
performance.  
 
The recent upsurge in accounting scandals at prominent companies (Enron, Tyco and 
Worldcom, etc) has largely shaken investors’ confidence. The failure was blamed on 
weak corporate governance of those firms, and thus regulators and academics 
became more interested in how to improve financial reporting quality through 
corporate governance mechanisms, especially regarding the board of directors. Some 
studies focus on associations between the board of directors and financial reporting 
fraud. For example, Beasley (1996) examines whether including a larger proportion 
of outside directors could reduce the likelihood of financial reporting fraud, and the 
empirical evidence is consistent with his hypothesis. This paper also analyzes the 
effects of outside director’s tenure, ownership and directorship, and finds a negative 
association between the above characteristics and the likelihood of fraud. Dechow et 
al (1996) investigates firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC for 
overstating earnings, and find they generally have weak governance structures, such 
as a high proportion of insiders on boards, significant stockholdings of inside 
directors, and combining the roles of CEO and Chairman in one person.  
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The results of Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al (1996) suggest a link between the 
board of directors and financial reporting quality, but they only focus on extreme 
cases in which the companies have violated GAAP. It is another question whether 
this link also exists for earnings management which is within the boundary of GAAP, 
but greatly concerns the public and regulators. Existing research generally supports 
the link. Klein (2002a) examines whether the compositions of the board and audit 
committee relate to earnings management measured by adjusted abnormal accruals. 
Negative relationships are found and the level of abnormal accruals increases when 
the independence of the board or audit committee decreases. Xie et al (2003) extend 
the research by taking into consideration more board characteristics (background of 
outside directors and board meeting frequency), and the empirical results show that 
independence, financial background and board meetings are helpful in preventing 
earnings management. Cornett et al (2006) examine earnings management at large 
publicly-traded bank holding companies, and find that this practice can be reduced 
by increasing the independence of the board. 
 
Most studies in this field [e.g., Klein (2002a), Xie et al (2003) and Cornett et al 
(2006)] concentrate on firms in the US market. The results may be different for firms 
in other countries due to different institutional environments. Using firms listed in 
Singapore and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, Bradbury et al (2004) find that board 
size is related to lower abnormal accruals, while the board independence is not 
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related to earnings management, which is inconsistent with the results of most US 
studies. Park and Shin (2004) examine whether outside directors can restrain the 
level earnings management in Canada. Results indicate that managers have incentive 
to manipulate earnings to avoid reporting losses or earnings declines. Inconsistent 
with their hypothesis, adding outside directors on board does not reduce earnings 
management by itself, but including outside directors from financial institutions 
helps to restrain income increasing earnings management. The possible explanations 
for why outside directors are not effective in curbing earnings management are the 
highly concentrated ownership structures of Canadian firms and the lack of a well-
developed labor market for outside directors. Like Park and Shin (2004), Peasnell et 
al (2005) also study the relationship between board composition and earnings 
management around earnings benchmarks. Their study stands out in selecting UK 
firms as samples which have as highly dispersed ownership structures as US firms 
but which have more diversified board characteristics. The results show that the 
proportion of outside directors is negatively related to the level of income-increasing 
earnings management, but has no effect on the level of income-decreasing earnings 
management while unmanaged earnings is high. 
 
In conclusion, the agency theory suggests that the board of directors is an essential 
tool for monitoring management on behalf of shareholders in order to alleviate 
agency costs. There is an increasing volume of literature which examines how the 
board of directors could affect firm value and financial reporting quality, or more 
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specifically, earnings management. Although inconclusive, the empirical results from 
academic research do indicate a relationship between earnings management and 
board characteristics, such as board composition, directors’ expertise and board 
meeting frequency, etc. Most studies are based on US firms, while only a few 
examine this topic in other territories, e.g. Bradbury et al (2004) in Singapore and 
Malaysia, Park and Shin (2004) in Canada and Peasnell et al (2005) in the UK. My 
thesis will be an extension of Peasnell et al (2005) in examining the effects of more 
comprehensive board characteristics and more current data. 
 
2.3 Review of literature on the audit committee  
The board of directors has an important role in corporate governance. The board 
usually delegates some authority and assigns specific functions to several 
committees which consist of subsets of board members. Since each committee has 
its own duties, the board’s performance in certain aspects is also related to the 
effectiveness of the committee which is in charge of this function. The audit 
committee plays an important role in helping the board discharge its responsibility to 
oversee the firm’s financial reporting process. As defined in Klein (2002a), the work 
of the audit commitment is to “meet regularly with the firm’s outside auditors and 
internal financial managers to review the corporation’s financial statements, audit 
process and internal accounting controls”. Thus, an effective audit committee should 
be able to protect shareholders’ interest and reduce the information asymmetry 
between inside managers and outsider shareholders by improving the quality of 
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financial reporting. 
 
The professional and research literature on audit committees is diverse and 
increasing rapidly, due to increased concerns about the effectiveness of the audit 
committee in recent high profile financial reporting fraud cases. Numerous 
professional publications have suggested “best practices” for audit committee [BRC 
(1999), NACD (2000), Cadbury (1992), the revised Combined Code (2003)]. More 
recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was passed, and it required all audit 
committee members to be independent and required to companies to disclose 
whether they have a financial expert on audit committee. Similarly, the NYSE and 
NASDAQ have also modified listing requirements related to the independence and 
financial expertise of the audit committees. The above suggests that the regulators 
are making effort to improve the effectiveness of audit committees  
 
The academic literature has also focused on how to improve the effectiveness of the 
audit committee in monitoring financial reporting process. A number of audit 
committee studies focus on the impact of audit committee characteristics on the audit 
function, such as the relationship with internal auditors, external auditors and audit 
quality. For example, Knapp (1987) conducts an experiment on 179 audit committee 
members and finds that committee members are more likely to support external 
auditors in auditor-management disputes when committee members are corporate 
managers of other firms. Abbott and Parker (2000) find that an active and 
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independent audit committee is more likely to hire an industry specialist as an 
external auditor. Archambeault and Dezoort (2001) find that companies with 
suspicious auditor switches tend to have less independent, smaller and more inactive 
audit committees with fewer committee members with accounting, finance or 
auditing experience. 
 
Some studies highlight the link between audit committees and financial reporting 
quality, measured by events such as the earnings restatements and accounting frauds. 
Early studies focus only on the impact of the existence of audit committees. For 
example, McMullen (1996) and Dechow et al (1996) both find that firms committing 
financial fraud are less likely to have audit committees. Some more recent papers 
explore whether the characteristics of the audit committee could affect financial 
reporting quality. Beasley et al (2000) compare the corporate governance differences 
between fraud companies and non-fraud benchmarks in technology, health-care and 
financial service industries, and find that fraud companies are less likely to have 
audit committees, and that their audit committees are less independent and active 
compared to non-fraud benchmarks. Abbott et al (2004) show that financial 
restatements are less likely to occur in firms whose audit committees are 
independent and have at least one financial expert. Although inconclusive, most 
studies find that the independence, financial expertise, and activity of audit 
committee are related to financial reporting quality. 
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Due to the upsurge of earnings management in the 1990’s [Levitt (1998), Cohen et al 
(2005)], some studies try to examine the role of audit committee in constraining 
earnings management, and the results are similar to those of studies in earnings 
restatement and accounting frauds. For example, Klein (2002a) finds that the 
independence of the audit committee is negatively related to abnormal accruals. Xie 
et al (2003) find that firms with audit committees which are more independent, 
which meet more frequently, and which have members with corporate or financial 
backgrounds, are less likely to engage in earnings management. The results of 
Be’dard et al (2004) also indicate that the audit committee’s independence, expertise, 
and activities (measured as a formal charter of audit committee responsibilities) are 
negatively related to the level of earnings management, and the effects are similar 
for both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management.  
 
Although there is an extensive literature on the audit committee, most studies are 
US-based and only a few are based on international settings. Song and Windram 
(2004) investigate a sample of UK firms subject to adverse rulings by the Financial 
Reporting Review Panel, and find that an active and financially literate audit 
committee contributes to the audit committee effectiveness. Contrary to recent trend 
of restricting outside directorships, they also find that multiple directorships may 
help to improve the audit committee effectiveness. Peasnell et al (2005) examine the 
effect of audit committee presence on earnings management in the UK. Unlike 
previous US studies, no significant effect of the existence of audit committee is 
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found, but the monitoring role of the board of directors on income-increasing 
earnings management is more pronounced where audit committee exists. These 
interesting findings suggest research opportunities to study audit committee 
effectiveness in the UK’s unique institutional settings. 
 
2.4 Corporate Governance in the UK 
Corporate governance has been attracting increasing attention from the public and 
regulators in the UK since the early 1990s. Several decades ago, the boards of UK 
firms were generally considered passive entities and were controlled by the 
management. However, a series of unexpected business failures and high profile 
accounting scandals which occurred in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (e.g. Polly 
Peck, BCCI, Maxwell Communications) exposed the corporate governance 
weaknesses of UK firms to the public, and showed the need for more restrictive 
legislation. 
 
As a response to the weak governance of UK firms, a series of corporate governance 
recommendations were developed throughout the 1990s. The Cadbury Report was 
issued by the committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in 1992 
and contained the Code of Best Practice which included guidelines for good 
governance. The code focused on the structure and responsibilities of the board of 
directors, highlighted the importance of outside directors and recommended 
establishing an audit committee as one way to improve the quality of financial 
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reporting. Following the Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury Report was issued 
by the Committee of Executive Pay in 1995. The Greenbury Report recommended 
good practices in determining a director’s remuneration and strengthened the role of 
outside directors by stating that remuneration committees should consist exclusively 
of outside directors. The Combined Code which comprises the recommendations of 
prior corporate governance reports was released in 1998.  
 
Following the accounting scandals such as Enron and Worldcom in the US, the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) commissioned two committees to review 
corporate governance in the UK. The Higgs report on non-executive directors and 
the Smith Report on audit committees were issued in January 2003. Following the 
recommendations of these reports, the FRC published the final text of the revised 
Combined Code in July 2003 which would apply to reporting years commencing on 
or after 1 November 2003. The revised Combined Code includes a number of new 
disclosure requirements in respect of terms of references, processes of board 
committees, and directors’ attendance at meetings. It also tightens the requirement 
for board independence, provides the definition of non-executive directors’ 
independence, and emphasizes the role of the audit committee in monitoring the 
integrity of a company’s financial reporting. 
 
 While companies are not under obligation to comply with the recommendations of 
the Combined Code, the London Stock Exchange requires all UK-incorporated listed 
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firms to include a statement of compliance with the code in their annual report and to 
clearly identify and explain areas of non-compliance, thereby making non-
compliance a potentially costly action. As evidence of widespread compliance, 
changes in UK corporate governance have been found after the Cadbury Report 
(1992) was published. Conyon (1994) examines changes in the governance 
structures of UK firms between 1988 and 1993, and finds the percentage of firms 
which separated the roles of CEO and Chairman increasing from 58% in 1988 to 
77% in 1993. Peasnell et al (2000) report that the proportion of outside directors on 
the board has increased after the Cadbury Report (1992) was published. The 
Cadbury Report (1992) highlights the importance of an audit committee and 
recommends this practice to all the companies as one way to improve the quality of 
financial reporting. Audit committees were not common in UK prior to the Cadbury 
Report (1992). Only 38 percent of the companies had audit committees in 1988, 
according to a survey by the Bank of England. However, Collier (1996) shows that 
audit committees have generally become more widespread among large firms after 
the issue of the Cadbury Report in 1992. By 1995, almost 92% of UK companies 
have established audit committees (Cadbury compliance report 1995).  
 
Although UK regulators and companies have made obvious efforts to improve the 
level of corporate governance, very limited empirical studies have been conducted to 
examine the association between corporate governance and earnings management in 
the UK market. Most previous studies used US firms. This thesis aims to study the 
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relationship between corporate governance and earnings management of UK 
companies, and expects to find some interesting results because of the different 
institutional settings in the UK and the US. The major difference between corporate 
governance in the UK and that in the US is that the Combined Code is simply a set of 
guidelines, while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (‘SOX”) is firm legislation with 
regulations written by the SEC, NYSE and other bodies. Therefore, compliance with 
the UK corporate governance code is voluntary, and investors are encouraged to 
evaluate a company’s corporate governance practices given its particular circumstance, 
rather than to simply look at compliance with the recommendations of corporate 
governance reports [Hamper report (1998)]. UK-listed companies are only required to 
include an explanation statement in their annual reports when they do not apply the 
corporate governance code. However, US-listed companies are very likely to face 
fines and imprisonment penalties when they violate the SOX. As a result, I expect the 
corporate governance characteristics of UK firms to be more diversified compared to 
US companies, and the relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
management will be more easily to detect, and this provides a unique opportunity for 
research. Another difference is the combination of CEO and chairman role. In the US, 
there is a large number of companies have CEO and Chairman as the same person 
[e.g., 85% of Xie et al (2003), and 75% of Keenan (2004)], but this is rare in the UK 
today, as the Combined Code 2003 suggested the role to be separated. When the 
power of the boardroom is concentrated in hands of CEO, it is not hard to understand 
why the prior US studies fail to find significant relationship between the CEO duality 
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and the earnings management, while there should a relationship theoretically. 
However, using a sample of UK firms, this thesis is expected to find empirical 
evidence of the association between the CEO duality and earnings management. 
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CHAPTER 3  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 The role of the board of directors 
According to the literature, earnings management can be seen as a potential agency 
cost since managers manipulate earnings to mislead shareholders and to fulfill their 
own interests. Therefore, to solve the agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, the board of directors should play a role in constraining the level of 
earnings management. Prior studies on financial reporting fraud [Beasley (1996), 
Dechow et al (1996)] also suggest that effective board monitoring helps to maintain 
the credibility of financial reports. Furthermore, it is one of the main principals in 
Combined Code (2003) that the board is responsible to present a balanced and understandable 
assessment of the company’s position and prospects, but the responsibility does not just limit to 
deterring frauds and misstatements in financial statements. The Cadbury Report (1992) 
emphasizes that the board also has a role in constraining the behavior which may manipulate the 
performance of the company although the behavior is within the boundary with GAAP. In the 
section of best practices relating to the board, it states that “a basic weakness in the current 
system of financial reporting is the possibility of different accounting treatments being applied to 
essentially the same facts, with the consequence that different results or financial positions 
could be reported, each apparently complying with the overriding requirement to show 
true and fair view” and it claims that “there are advantages to investors, analysts, other 
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accounts users and ultimately to the company itself in financial reporting rules which 
limit the scope for uncertainty and manipulation”. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize 
that an effective board of directors will help to limit earnings management. Prior 
studies find that some characteristics of the board are related to its effectiveness, 
especially in monitoring top managers. These characteristics are the independence of 
the board, the competence of outside directors, outside directors’ ownership, and the 
activities of the board. In the following sections, several hypotheses on the 
relationship between board characteristics and earnings management will be 
proposed. 
 
3.1.1 The independence of the board from management 
Fama and Jensen (1983) recognize the control function of the board as the most 
critical role of directors. They argue that the board is not an effective device for 
decision control unless it limits the decision discretion of individual top managers. 
Furthermore, the Cadbury Report (1992) suggests that “an important aspect of 
effective corporate governance is the recognition that the specific interests of the 
executive management and the wider interests of the company may at times diverge”. 
Therefore, the independence of the board from management is one of the important 
factors in determining board effectiveness in monitoring management. Hence, we 
expect to see that board independence has a positive relation with board effectiveness 
in limiting earnings management. However, since such independence is 
fundamentally unobservable, it must be measured by some proxies. Three proxies are 
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commonly used in previous studies. One is the board composition of outside directors, 
the second is the combination of the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board 
in one person, and the last is the financial dependence of outside directors. 
 
Although the specific knowledge about the organization that the inside directors can 
provide is a valuable contribution to the decision control function of the board, the 
domination of managers on the board can lead to collusion and the transfer of 
stockholder wealth (Fama (1980)). When an agency problem occurs, outside 
directors who are generally considered independent of management are likely to be 
more effective in protecting the interests of shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary to 
include outside directors to maintain the independence of the board. In addition, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) observe that outside directors have incentives to develop 
their reputations as experts in decision control and monitoring because the labor 
market will price their services according to their performance.  
 
The percentage of outside directors on the boards has been increasing in recent years. 
Many corporate governance codes recommend adding outside directors (for example, 
the BRC report 1999), and previous empirical studies show an association between 
the proportion of outside directors and the board’s effectiveness in monitoring 
management. Weisbach (1988) finds a stronger association between firm 
performance (measured as earnings and stock return) and CEO turnover in outsider-
dominated boards than in insider-dominated boards, and this indicates that outside 
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directors base their evaluation of CEO performance more on firm performance. 
Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al (1996) document a negative relationship between 
outside directors and the incidence of financial fraud. More specifically, some 
studies present evidence that the proportion of outside directors is negatively related 
to the level of earnings management [Peasnell et al (2005), Klein (2002a) and Xie et 
al (2003)]. Based on the theory of Fama and Jensen (1983) and the results of prior 
studies, the following hypothesis is proposed and will be verified by the results of 
this research paper: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of outside 
directors on the board and the level of earnings management.   
 
Besides the proportion of outside directors on the board, the separation of the roles 
of the chairman of the board and the CEO can also affect the independence of the 
board. The role of the chairman is pivotal to securing good corporate governance. 
According to Jensen (1993), the function of the chairman of the board is to run board 
meetings, and to oversee the processes of hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating 
the CEO. Therefore, when the chairman of the board and the CEO is the same person, 
the firm is controlled by one person and the board is not independent of the 
management. Hence, a number of corporate governance codes (Cadbury Report 
1992, the Combined Code 1998, and the revised Combined Code 2003) recommend 
that the roles of the chairman and the CEO should be separate. Some empirical 
studies also demonstrate that this combination can affect the board’s effectiveness in 
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monitoring management. For instance, Dechow et al (1996) that find firms are more 
likely to be subject to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC for alleged 
violations of GAAP, if they have the CEO simultaneously serving as the chair of the 
board. Thus, the second hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: The combination of the roles of CEO and the chairman of the board in 
one person is positively related to the level of earnings management. 
 
It is usual for outside directors to receive a fixed annual fee for their services. 
However, they may also receive other forms of remuneration or reward from the 
company. When Enron collapsed, it was revealed that a number of non-executive 
directors receive benefits from the company in addition to a basic fee, such as 
consultant fees. This affiliation may bring the non-executive directors and 
management into close working relationship and put the independence of non-
executive directors at risk. Another form of remuneration which might hurt the 
independence of outside directors is stock options. If the directors are rewarded by 
large blocks of stock options, they are more inclined to ensure a high stock price of 
that company when they are exercising their options. If the earnings figure does not 
come out “right”, and managers have to adjust it, such directors may not have 
incentives to prevent this practice. Therefore, the Cadbury Report recommends that 
outside directors should not participate in share option schemes since the 
independence of non-executive directors might be compromised. Hence, the third 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 32
Chapter 3  Hypotheses Development 
Hypothesis 3: The use of compensation other than annual fees and meeting fees for 
outside directors is positively related to the level of earnings management. 
 
 3.1. 2 Competence of outside directors 
Increasing the proportion of outside directors cannot guarantee the effectiveness of 
the board monitoring. Outside directors have to possess the necessary competence in 
carrying out their control and oversight duties, for which the knowledge of company 
specific affairs is particularly essential [Be’dard et al (2004)]. The wider the 
experience of outside directors on the board, the better will be their knowledge of the 
company and its executives. Therefore, outside directors may be more capable of 
monitoring managers and the financial reporting process if they have served the 
board for a longer period. This assertion is supported by many previous studies. For 
instance, Beasley (1996) finds the likelihood of financial reporting fraud is 
negatively related to the average tenure of non-executive directors. Be’dard et al 
(2004) find that the average tenure of outside directors is negatively associated with 
the level of earnings management. Thus, the following hypothesis is empirically 
tested: 
Hypothesis 4: The average tenure of outside directors is positively related to the 
level of earnings management. 
 
However, outside directors with longer tenure are also more likely to be entrenched 
with managers and thus become less effective as monitors. This argument is 
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consistent with the Board Guidelines 1999 issued by the National Association of 
Corporate Directors (NACD 1999), which states that outside directors may lose 
some of their independence if they stay on the board for too long. Xie et al (2003) 
also find a positive association between the average tenure of outside directors and 
the level of earnings management. Although the Combined Code (1998) argues that 
a reasonably long tenure on the board can give directors a deeper understanding of 
the company’s business, the revised Combined Code (2003) recommends that 
outside directors who have served more than nine years should be re-elected 
annually at the Annual General Meeting, and such directors are prima facie deemed 
to be non-independent. Therefore, the tenure of outside directors and earnings 
management may be positively related when the tenure is too long, and we will 
further shed light on this issue by empirical testing. 
 
Apart from the tenure of outside directors, another possible measure of the outside 
director’s competence is the directorships that he holds in other companies. There 
are conflicting views of multiple directorships. On one hand, some people believe 
that the outside directors may not have enough time to perform their duties 
effectively if they sit on too many boards [Morck et al (1988), Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992), and Core et al (1999)]. In 1995, SEC Chairman, Authur Levitt, said “the 
commitment of adequate time is an essential requirement for directors”. The NACD 
1999 also suggests that retired executives or professional directors should serve on 
no more than six boards.  
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On the other hand, Fama and Jensen (1983) indicate that outside directors have the 
incentive to monitor firms effectively in order to be invited to join other boards, 
since the human capital market values active monitors. The directorships held by 
outside directors can be considered as a signal of their ability as monitors. Consistent 
with Fama and Jensen (1983), Ferris et al (2003) find the firm performance is 
positively related to the number of directorships subsequently held by its directors, 
and there is no evidence that multiple directorships will harm subsequent firm 
performance. The positive relationship between outside directorships and the quality 
of financial reporting also can be demonstrated by empirical studies. Be’dard et al 
(2004) and Xie et al (2003) find that the number of outside directorships is 
negatively related to the level of earnings management.  
 
Although there is a concern with multiple directorships, some previous surveys 
suggest that the average number of directorships held by outside directors in the UK 
is relatively low [Peasnell et al (1999)], and thus the problem of lack of time is 
unlikely to be a concern in the UK. Based on the prior literature, the following 
hypothesis is tested in this thesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The number of directorships held by outside directors is negatively 
related to the level of earnings management.  
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3.1.3 Ownership of outside directors 
It is generally believed that the directors who have substantial stock ownership are 
more likely to monitor management in order to protect shareholders’ interests, since 
their own wealth is involved. For outside directors who hold no position in the firm 
other than that of serving on the board, Jensen (1993) asserts that holding a sizable 
amount of stock provides them with better incentives to monitor management closely. 
Many empirical studies also support this assertion. For instance, Beasley (1996) 
finds that the likelihood of accounting fraud is negatively related to the stock 
ownership of outside directors. Consistent with the above evidence, the Combined 
Code (1998) recommends that “payment of part of a non-executive director’s 
remuneration in shares can be a useful and legitimate way of aligning the director’s 
interests with those of the shareholders”.  Therefore it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 6: Stock ownership by outside directors is negatively related to the level 
of earnings management. 
 
3.1.4 Activities of the board 
It is generally believed that a more active board is better for shareholders’ interests, 
because directors have to spend more time and energy on the company’s affairs in an 
active board. Conger et al (2001) suggest that board meeting time is an important 
resource for improving the effectiveness of the board. Many professional and 
academic publications have made the criticism that directors have too little time to 
attend meetings regularly and this limits their ability to monitor management, and 
the recently published revised Combined Code (2003) of the UK requires firm to 
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disclose the board meeting frequency and individual director’s attendance in the 
annual report. Vafeas (1999) empirically tests the relation between board activity 
(which is measured by board meeting frequency) and the firm’s performance. He 
finds that an increase in the number of board meetings leads to improved firm 
performance, and his results demonstrate that frequent board meetings can help to 
make up for limited director interaction time. Moreover, Xie et al (2003) find that an 
active board could help to constrain earnings management. According to the above 
studies, it is reasonable to conclude that frequent board meetings can help to improve 
board effectiveness in monitoring, and thus have some effect in constraining 
earnings management. Therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested:  
Hypothesis 7: The frequency of board meetings is negatively related to the level of 
earnings management.  
3.2 The role of the audit committee  
While all directors have a duty to act in the interests of the company, the audit committee has a 
particular role, acting independently from the executive, to ensure that the interests of 
shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial reporting and internal control, since the 
responsibility of the audit committee is to “monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the 
company, and any formal announcements relating to the company’s financial performance, 
reviewing significant financial reporting judgments contained in them” [the Combined Code 
(2003)]. As the interest of outside shareholders might be adversely affected by earnings 
management, the auditor committee should play a role in curbing earnings management. The audit 
committees have several ways to detect earnings management. They keep communication with 
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both the management and external auditors to assess the appropriateness of accounting policies, 
estimates and judgments. Smith report (2003) recommends that the management should inform 
the audit committee of the methods used to account for significant or unusual transactions where 
the accounting treatment is open to different approaches. While during the annual audit cycle, the 
audit committee should discuss with auditor not only errors identified during the audit, but also 
any major issues that arose during the audit, key accounting and audit judgments.  The review of 
previous research has also provided some empirical evidence that an effective audit 
committee can improve financial reporting quality. However what kind of audit 
committee is effective? DeZoort et al (2002) define it as follows: “An effective audit 
committee has qualified members with authority and resources to protect stakeholder 
interests by ensuring reliable financial reporting, internal controls and risk 
management through its diligent oversight efforts”.  
 
The above definition identifies four key elements for audit committee effectiveness: 
composition, authority, resources and diligence. Since the four elements are 
unobservable, proxies for them have to be found for empirical research. However, 
the existing literature on authority and resources has not provided such proxies and 
heavily rely on survey methods [e.g., Dezoort (1997), Cohen et al (2002)]. Thus, I 
will not examine the effects of audit committee authority and resources on the level 
of earnings management in this thesis. For composition and diligence, the 
independence, the financial expertise and activity of the committee are three 
important and most frequently addressed variables. In the following sub-sections, 
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testable hypotheses will be developed on how these three characteristics of audit 
committee affect the level of earnings management. 
  
3.2.1 Independence of the audit committee 
It is generally believed that audit committee members who are independent of 
management are better monitors. Previous studies provide evidence that an 
independent audit committee is better at monitoring the financial reporting and 
auditing processes of the firm [e.g., Abbott and Parker (2000); Beasley et al (2000); 
Carcello and Neal (2000); McMullen and Raghunandan (1996)].  Some studies 
further examine the link between the independence of the audit committee and 
earnings management, using samples from the United States [e.g., Be’dard et al 
(2004); Klein (2002a); Xie et al (2003)]. 
 
Research on the independence of the audit committee goes beyond the simple 
classification of outside and inside directors. Researchers generally classify outside 
directors into one of two categories: “independent directors” and “grey directors”. 
Grey directors include former officers or employees of the company or a related 
entity, as well as relatives of management and professional advisors to the company 
[Beasley (1996); Carcello and Neal (2000)]. However, independent directors have no 
affiliation with the firm other than being on the board. Previous studies have shown 
that the personal or economic affiliation that grey directors have with the corporate 
management may impair their independence.  For instance, Carcello and Neal (2000) 
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find that the percentage of inside and grey directors has a negative relationship with 
the probability that the auditor will issue a going-concern report when the firm is 
experiencing financial distress.  
 
Regulators generally believe that independence is important to audit committee 
effectiveness and laws become more restrictive on the independence of audit 
committee members. The Cadbury Report (1992) and the Combined Code (1998) do 
not insist on a totally independent audit committee, but suggest that the membership 
of an audit committee should be confined to non-executive directors, and that the 
majority of outside directors serving on the committee should be independent. The 
recent corporate governance recommendations and regulations [SOX (2002) and the 
revised Combined Code (2003)] require firms to have fully independent audit 
committees. Thus, it is expected that an audit committee which only includes 
independent directors would be better able to restrain earnings management.  
 
However, researchers have not found conclusive evidence as whether wholly 
independent audit committees improve governance. For example, Klein (2002a) fails 
to find association between earnings management and fully independent audit 
committee, while Be’dard et al (2004) demonstrate that a fully independent audit 
committee helps to deter earnings management. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
proposed to test this issue empirically:  
H8: The presence of an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors is 
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negatively related to the level of earnings management.  
3.2.2 Financial expertise of audit committee members 
Another important variable which could affect the effectiveness of an audit committee 
is member competence. Independent directors may have intentions of curbing 
earnings management for shareholders, but they may not be able to do so without a 
certain level of financial knowledge. The BRC Report (1999) recommends that each 
member of an audit committee should be financially literate; and at least one of the 
members should have accounting or related financial management expertise. SOX 
(2002) requires that firms disclose whether they have a financial expert on their audit 
committee, and if not, why not. In the UK, the Smith Report (2003) recommends that 
“at least one member of the audit committee should have significant, recent and 
relevant financial experience, for example, as an auditor or a finance director of a 
listed company. It is highly desirable for this member to have professional 
qualifications from one of the professional accountancy bodies”. This suggests that 
the qualifications of audit committee members are seen as an important factor 
affecting the effectiveness of audit committees in the UK. 
 
The positive effect of having audit committee members with financial expertise is 
supported by a number of empirical studies. McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) 
find that companies with financial reporting problems are less likely to have CPAs 
on the audit committee. The results of Song and Windram (2004) suggest that 
financial literacy helps to decrease the probability of violating financial reporting 
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regulations. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) also find that the incidence of independent 
directors with accounting or finance background sitting on the audit committee is 
negatively related to the probability of earnings restatement. 
 
The existing literature demonstrates that the expertise of members not only increases 
the quality of financial reporting and auditing, but also decreases the probability of 
accounting fraud. Hence it is expected that the financial expertise of audit committee 
members can also improve their ability to detect and constrain earnings management. 
Therefore, this thesis will test the following hypothesis: 
H9: The financial expertise of audit committee members is negatively related to the 
level of earnings management.  
3.2.3 The audit committee’s activities 
As a common proxy for audit committee diligence, meeting frequency has been 
generally considered an essential component of audit committee effectiveness. Menon 
and Williams (1994) note that audit committees that do not meet, or meet infrequently, 
are unlikely to be effective monitors. In line with this argument, the NACD (2000) 
also recommends that “The audit committee should meet as frequently as necessary to 
perform its role”. Some studies find a negative relationship between meeting 
frequency and the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting [e.g., Beasley et al 
(2000), Abbott et al (2004), Song and Windram (2004)]. Some other studies, such as 
Abbott and Parker (2000), link the number of meetings with higher audit quality. In 
summary, a range of empirical results support the assertion that the meeting frequency 
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of an audit committee is positively associated with financial reporting quality. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H10: The frequency of audit committee meetings is negatively related to the level of 
earnings management.  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Measurement of earnings management 
Although there is no perfect proxy for earnings management, most current studies 
focus on identifying discretionary accruals based on the relation between total 
accruals and hypothesized explanatory variable. Among the available models to 
estimate discretionary accruals, Modified Jones Model is one of the most commonly 
used in the literature. For example, Teoh et al (1998a and 1998b) use modified Jones 
model to estimate discretionary current accruals and find that Seasoned Equity issuers 
and IPO issuers can report higher earnings by adjusting the discretionary accruals. 
Matsumoto (2002) also distract discretionary accrual by adopting Modified Jones 
Model to examine whether managers manipulate earnings to avoid negative earnings 
surprises.  Consistent with previous literature, this study estimates discretionary 
accruals using the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones Model. More 
specifically, this thesis focuses on the relationship between discretionary current 
accruals (DCAs) and the level of earnings management. 
 
There are several reasons for measuring earnings management using DCA instead of 
total discretionary accruals, which is current accruals plus long-term accruals. First, 
current accruals are adjustments for short-term assets and liabilities, and thus easier 
for managers to manipulate [Teoh et al (1998b)]. Second, the only long-term accrual 
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that has been included in prior studies is depreciation. However, manager can not 
change depreciation policy frequently without attracting attention from auditors or 
investors, so depreciation has limited potential as a tool for earnings management.  
[ Beneish (1998)].   
 
The model for estimating DCA is as follows. First, the following regression model is 

























                                                           (1) 
Where  represents the current accruals of firm i, defined as the change of non-
cash current assets less the change of current liabilities. 
tiCA ,
tiREV ,Δ is the change of 
revenue between year t and t-1, and  is the book value of the total assets of 
year t-1. The regression is carried out for each industry-year combination. 
1, −tiTA
 




















NDCA αα                                                      (2) 
where 1αˆ  and 2αˆ are OLS estimates for the coefficients in equation (1) and  
is the change of net receivables. 
tiREC ,Δ
 
Finally, the discretionary current accruals (DCAs) are obtained as the remaining 
portion of current accruals. In this thesis, the DCAs are used to measure the level of 











                                                                                     (3) 
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There are considerable discussions on the efficiency of modified Jones Model in 
detecting earnings management. Dechow et al (1995) and Kasznik (1999) show that 
estimated discretionary accruals are associated with reported earnings, and it is more 
likely to detect earnings management  for firms with extreme financial performance.  
Thus, it raises a question whether the evidence of earnings management found by 
previous studies are enhanced by measurement error in discretionary accruals.  
 
However, previous studies also demonstrate the superiority of the modified Jones 
model over all other currently available models, though the Jones model remains 
imperfect. Dechow et al (1995) access the specification and power of five accrual-
based models in detecting earnings management. They find that all the models are 
well specified and the modified Jones model is the most powerful one in detecting 
earnings management.  Guay et al (1996) investigate the relative merits of various 
discretionary accrual models and conclude that the cross-sectional Jones and cross-
sectional modified Jones models are most effective in identifying discretionary 
accruals.  
 
Although literature has document the limitations of Jones like models, there is no 
commonly tested and accepted alternative model has been developed yet. In fact, the 
modified Jones model is still widely applied even by the most recent studies. For 
instance, Kwon and Yin (2006), Abbott et al (2006), Cornett (2006) and Santanu 
(2007) all use modified Jones model to examine the relation between earnings 
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management and variables such as executive compensation and audit fee.  
 
Moreover, many prior studies in corporate governance and earnings management 
apply the modified Jones Model to estimate discretionary current Accruals [e.g., Xie 
et al (2003); Park and Shin (2004); Peasnell et al (2005)]. By using the same method, 
the results of this thesis could be more comparable to prior studies.  
 
Based on the above reasons, I argue that the modified Jones Model is the best 
available candidate for the purpose of this study, despite the potential problems of 
the model. The purpose of this thesis is to study the role of board of directors and 
audit committee in constraining the level of earnings management. Therefore, to 
achieve improvement in earnings management model is beyond the scope of this 
study and I will leave it as a future research opportunity.  
 
4.2 Earnings benchmarks 
Several papers report that managers have incentives to meet simple earnings 
benchmarks, which include avoiding losses and earnings declines, and exceeding 
analysts’ forecasts [Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al (1999)]. Both 
studies find that small reported losses (small profit declines) are rare; while small 
reported profits (small profit increases) are common. The results imply that earnings 
management is more pronounced when earnings are below certain benchmarks. 
Managers could also manipulate earnings downwards if the unmanaged earnings are 
well above the benchmark, so that they can “save” the profit for the bad years. Thus, 
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the role of the board and audit committee in constraining earnings management 
around the earnings benchmarks is examined in this thesis. 
 
Following Park and Shin (2004) and Peasnell et al (2005), this study uses two 
earnings benchmarks: zero earnings and the previous year’s earnings. The sample is 
classified according to whether the unmanaged earnings (reported earnings minus 
the discretionary accruals) meet or miss the benchmark. It is expected to find 
income-increasing accruals when the unmanaged earnings are below the benchmarks, 
and to find income-decreasing accruals when unmanaged earnings are above the 
benchmarks. Next, the relationships between the board of directors/the audit 
committee and earnings management are examined to determine if they could help to 
decrease the income-increasing (income-decreasing) accruals.  Degeorge et al (1999) 
argue that there seems to be a hierarchy to the benchmarks, and meeting analyst 
forecast seems less important than reporting profit or earnings growth. Moreover, 
unlike the other two benchmarks, analyst forecast can also be influenced by 
managers. Therefore, analyst forecast is not selected as a benchmark in this study, in 
order to increase the power of the tests. However, the tests results using analyst 
forecast as benchmark are reported in the Additional Analysis in Section 5.4.2. 
 
Reported earnings minus the discretionary accruals are used as proxy for unmanaged 
earnings, and this method is supported by previous research, such as, Gore et al 
(2002), Park and Shin (2004), and Cornett (2006). Although the possible 
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measurement error of modified Jones model mentioned in Section 4.1 could also 
cause the error in unmanaged earning, it is unclear whether the problem is so serious 
as to significantly change the test results regarding the role of board of directors and 
audit committee in restraining earnings management. Peasnell et al (2005) try to 
avoid this problem by using Cash Flow from Operating (CFO) as the proxy for 
unmanaged earnings. However, the validity of CFO as the proxy has not been 
confirmed by any other studies. Moreover, they also mention that the results are 
substantially similar to those using reported earnings minus discretionary accruals as 
proxy.   
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
To analyze the effects of the characteristics of the board and audit committee on 
earnings management, the following regression models were first constructed:  









Model 2: (for the audit committee)  
εβαααα +++++= ∑ controlsAUDMEETFININDAUDDCA i3210  
 
For the independent variables in Model 1, OUT is the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board. DUAL is a dummy variable with value 1 if the CEO and 
Chairman of the board is the same person, and zero otherwise. TENURE is the 
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average years of service of non-executive directors on the board. DIRSHIP is the 
average number of directorships held by non-executive directors in unaffiliated firms. 
BRDMEET is the number of board meetings per year. OTHERBEN is a dummy 
variable with value 1 if non-executive directors receive compensation other than 
annual fees and meeting fees. STKOWN is the cumulative percentage of shares held 
by non-executive directors. OUT, TENURE, DIRSHIP, BRDMEET and STKOWN 
were expected to have negative (positive) coefficients in the regression of sub-
samples with unmanaged earnings below (above) earnings benchmarks, while 
DUAL and OTHERBEN were expected to have positive (negative) coefficients. 
 
In MODEL 2, INDAUD is a dummy variable with value 1 if the audit committee is 
composed solely of independent directors. FIN is the proxy for members’ financial 
expertise, and is also an indicator variable with value 1 if there is at least one 
member who has past employment experience in finance or accounting. This 
definition is more restrictive than that of the BRC Report 1999, and consistent with 
the revised Combined Code (2003) which recommends that one member must 
possess recent and relevant experience in finance. AUDMEET is the number of 
meetings that an audit committee has in a year. It is expected that INDAUD, FIN and 
MEETAUD will have negative (positive) coefficients when the unmanaged earnings 
are below (above) earnings benchmarks. 
 
The above two regression models control for some other dimensions of corporate 
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governance and incentives for earnings management which could affect the level of 
discretionary accruals. BRDSIZE is the number of directors on the board. This factor 
is controlled because Jensen (1993) argues that a larger board is less effective and 
more easily to be controlled by the CEO because it is more difficult for directors to 
coordinate. Bradbury, Mak and Tan (2004) report the negative relationship between 
board size and the level of earnings management. 
 
BLOCK is the percentage of outstanding shares held by outside shareholders who 
own at least 3% of a firm’s shares. This variable controls for the potential monitoring 
by blockholders on earnings management. MANOWN is the fraction of outstanding 
shares held by managers. This measure is related to discretionary accruals because it 
reflects the extent to which the interests of managers are aligned with those of 
shareholders. As Warfield et al (1995) postulate, managerial ownership is inversely 
related to the magnitude of accounting accrual adjustments.  
 
BIG5 is an indicator variable with value 1 if the external auditor of the firm is one of 
the “big 5”1 audit firms and controls for the effects of audit quality. Previous studies 
suggest that “big 5” auditors are generally more effective in deterring earnings 
management than other auditors [e.g., Becker et al 1998 and Kim et al (2003)]. 
 
                                                        
1 The “big 5” refers to a group of international accountancy firms that handle the vast majority of 
audits for publicly traded corporations. As at year 2002, the sample period of this study, they were 
Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young,  KPMG and Authur Andersen. After the collapse 
of Auther Andersen, the “big 5” became “big 4”in 2003. 
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LEV is the financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. On 
one hand, firms with a high leverage ratio may have incentives to adjust earnings 
upwards to avoid violating debt covenants. On the other hand, such firms may be 
under the close scrutiny of lenders and are less able to do so. Therefore, the 
relationship between LEV and discretionary accruals is indeterminate.  
 
SIZE is the natural log of sales. This factor is controlled as a possible determinant of 
the choice of discretionary accruals. [e.g., Beck et al (1998) and Park and Shin 
(2004)]. YEAR is an indicator variable control for time effects. 
 
Based on the unmanaged earnings, the samples were split into two sub-sets, and then 
regression Models 1 and 2 were run in each sub-set. Therefore, for every model, the 
regression was run four times. Two of them were for firm-year observations with 
unmanaged earnings of below or above zero, and the other two were for firm-year 
observations with unmanaged earnings of less than or more than the previous year’s 
earnings.  
4.4 Sample selection 
The empirical tests are conducted using data of UK-listed companies in the fiscal 
years 2000 and 2002. The primary samples for this thesis are the companies which 
constitute the FTSE 350 index at the end of each year. The data for the board and the 
audit committee characteristics, ownership structure, and outside auditors are 
extracted from the annual reports, while the accounting data are collected from 
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Compustat Global. Most of the annual reports are downloaded from the companies’ 
websites, and the others are hard copies requested from the companies which do not 
have online annual reports.  
 
As a result, 126 firm-year observations are first eliminated because the annual 
reports are not available from the two above sources. All the financial firms (SIC 
codes 60-69) are then excluded, since it is difficult to define accruals and 
discretionary accruals for financial firms. For the purpose of estimating abnormal 
accruals, the industry-year portfolios with less than six observations are also 
excluded from the analysis. The final sample consists of 344 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 summarizes how the final sample is constructed.  
 
Table 1 Sample selection 
 
The initial 700 firm-year observations are FTSE350 firms for the fiscal year 2000 and 2002. After the 
selection procedure shown as below, the final sample includes 153 and 191 firm-year observations in 
year 2000 and 2002 respectively. 
            Firm-years 
Initial  samples for 2000 and 2002    700 
Less: Firms with no annual reports available     126 
Less: Financial firms (Sic code 60-69)    187 
Less: Firms in industries with less than 6 observations  23 
Less: Firms with missing Compustat data  22 
Final Sample       344 
Year 2000      153 
Year 2002          191 
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 CHAPTER 5  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the board of directors and audit committee variables and 
control variables are reported in Table 2. In the sample, the average board contains 9 
directors, 54% of whom are outside directors. 10 percent of the firms combine the 
roles of the chairman and the chief executive, while beyond the annual fees, 25% of 
the firms give extra compensation to their outside directors, such as stock options, 
pension plans and consultant fees.  The outside directors’ average holding of stock is 
1.467% and the median holding is 0.025%. In addition, 79% of audit committees are 
totally independent and 78% of the cases have at least one director with working 
experience in accounting or finance. The average frequency of meetings is 8.4 times 
per year for the board and 3 times per year for the audit committee. The average total 
shareholding by blockholders is 28%, which implies that UK firms have widely 
dispersed shareholdings. Managerial ownership is right skewed with a mean value of 
3.69% and median value of 0.148%. In addition, 97% of firms are audited by “Big5” 
accounting firms and this is probably because the samples mainly consist of big 
firms (FTSE350). Only 6% of the firms experience two consecutive years of losses 
prior to the sample year.   
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 Table 2 Descriptive statistics of explanatory and control variables 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of explanatory and control variables for the sample of 344 firm-
year observations for the years 2000 and 2002.  As shown in the column of number on observations, 
some data is missing since some information was not disclosed in the Annual Reports.  
 
Explanatory and control variables are explained as follows: OUT is the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board. DUAL equals to 1 if the CEO and Chairman of the board is the same person 
and zero otherwise. TENURE is the average years of service of non-executive directors on the board. 
DIRSHIP is the average number of directorships held by non-executive directors in unaffiliated firms. 
BRDMEET is the number of board meetings per year. OTHERBEN equals to 1 if non-executive 
directors receive benefits other than annual fees and meeting fees and zero otherwise.  STKOWN is 
the cumulative percentage of shares held by non-executive directors. INDAUD equals to 1 if the audit 
committee is composed solely of independent directors and zero otherwise. FIN equals 1 if there is at 
least one member with past employment experience in finance or accounting, and zero otherwise. 
AUDMEET is the number of meetings that the audit committee have in a year. BRDSIZE is the total 
number of board members. BLOCK is the percentage of outstanding shares held by outside block 
holders who own at least 3% of the firm’s shares. MANOWN is the percentage of outstanding shares 
held by managers. BIG5 equals to 1 if the external auditor of the firm is a BIG 5 firm, and zero 
otherwise. LEV is the financial leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. SIZE is the 




observations Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Percentiles 
 Valid Missing    25% 75% 
Explanatory 
variables         
OUT 344 0 0.538 0.533 0.128 0.444 0.623 
DUAL 344 0 0.100 0.000 0.295 0.000 0.000 
TENURE 343 1 4.853 4.000 2.944 2.860 6.000 
DIRSHIP 344 0 2.009 2.000 0.969 1.283 2.500 
BRDMEET 277 67 8.420 8.000 2.439 6.000 10.000 
OTHERBEN 344 0 0.250 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.750 
STKOWN (%) 344 0 1.467 0.025 4.872 0.009 0.140 
INDAUD 344 0 0.790 1.000 0.409 1.000 1.000 
FIN 344 0 0.780 1.000 0.417 1.000 1.000 
AUDMEET 250 94 2.900 3.000 1.075 2.000 3.000 
Control variables        
BRDSIZE 344 0 9.650 9.000 2.535 8.000 11.000 
BLOCK 341 3 28.431 26.000 18.096 15.000 40.000 
MANOWN 344 0 3.693 0.148 10.357 0.038 1.127 
BIG5 344 0 0.974 1.000 0.160 1.000 1.000 
LEV 344 0 0.232 0.223 0.165 0.100 0.329 
SIZE 344 0 6.951 7.004 1.502 6.006 8.074 
 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the values of discretionary current accruals (DCAs) around 
the earnings benchmarks. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of DCAs and the 
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 absolute values of DCAs. Among 344 firm-years, 100 (199) firms-years have 
unmanaged earnings (UMEs) of less than zero (earnings of previous year), while 244 
(135) firm-years have UMEs above zero (earnings of previous year). The DCAs are 
significantly positive (negative) when UMEs are below (above) the benchmarks, and 
this result is consistent with the hypothesis that managers will employ income-
increasing accounting choices to avoid missing earnings benchmarks and employ 
income-decreasing accounting choices when the UMEs are already above the 
benchmarks.   
 
Table 3 Discretionary Current Accruals 
A discretionary current accrual (DCA) is estimated as the difference between actual current accruals 
and non-current accruals estimated by the Modified Jones model. Unmanaged earnings (UMEs) are 
calculated as reported earning less discretionary current accruals. Panel A of Table 3 reports the 
descriptive statistics of DCAs and abnormal value of DCAs. Panel B reports the mean of DCA when 
UMEs are below or above the earning benchmarks (zero and earning of previous year). The null 
hypothesis of Panel B is that DCAs equal to zero. P value in Panel B is the result of t-test. 
  
** Indicates level of significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
DCA 344 0.0125 (0.7003) 0.8979 0.1316 
Absolute value of DCA 344 0.0793 0.0003 0.8979 0.10485 
 
Panel B: DCA around earnings benchmarks 
 UME< zero  UME≥zero 
UME< Earning of 
previous year 
PME≥ Earning of 
previous year 
DCA 0.101** (0.024)** 0.065** (0.059)** 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of Observations 100 244 199 135 
5.2. Univariate Analysis 
5. 2. 1. Board Characteristics 
This study first considered whether the magnitude of DCA is smaller for firms with 
more independent boards. The results are presented in Table 4.  
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 Panel A of Table 4 shows the relationship between the board’s composition and the 
DCA. Since Klein (2002a) finds that a board which has a majority of outside 
directors (more than 50%) is more capable of restraining the level of earnings 
management, the sample firms based on this measure were separated. Although the 
mean of DCA for firms with a majority of outside directors on the board is less than 
that of firms with less than 50% of outside directors, when the UMEs are below the 
earnings benchmarks, the difference is not statistically significant. Although the 
corporate governance codes of the UK, and several previous studies recommended 
an increase in the proportion of outside directors, it cannot be concluded from the 
results here that the presence of more outside directors on the board helps to 
constrain the level of earnings management. 
 
Panel B shows that firms in which the CEO is also Chairman of the board have 
higher (lower) income-increasing (income-decreasing) discretionary abnormal 
accruals when unmanaged earnings are less (more) than the earnings of the previous 
year. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that a combination of the roles of 
the CEO and the Chairman in one person is positively related to the level of earnings 
management. The results of Panel C suggest that whether or not the firm 
compensates outside directors in forms other than annual fees and meeting fees does 






 Table 4 DCA as a function of earnings benchmarks and the board’s 
independence 
Table 4 reports the means of DCA for sub-samples partitioned by board independence variables and 
earnings benchmarks. The null hypothesis of Panel A is that there are no differences in DCA whether 
or not the board has a majority of outside directors, and DOUT takes the value of 1 if the board has a 
majority of outside directors and zero otherwise. The null hypotheses of Panels B and C are there are 
no differences in DCA whether or not the Chairman of the board is also the CEO of the firm, or 
whether or not the outside directors receive benefits other than annual fees and meeting fees.  
 
Numbers in the square brackets are the number of observations, and the numbers in the parentheses 
are t-statistics.  
* indicates the level of significance at 10%. The test of significance is two-tailed. 
Panel A 
DOUT UME< zero  UME≥zero 
UME<Earnings of 
previous year 
UME≥ Earnings of 
previous year 
0 0.115[44] -0.021[126] 0.069[103] -0.061[64] 
1 0.091[56] -0.027[118] 0.060[96] -0.058[71] 
Mean 
Difference 
0.024(0.439) 0.007(0.610) 0.009(0.516) -0.003(0.890) 
 
Panel B 




of previous year 
0 0.097[91] -0.025[220] 0.060[175] -0.055[127] 
1 0.128[9] -0.011[24] 0.100[24] -0.136[8] 
Mean Difference -0.030(0.579) -0.015(0.503) -0.040(0.07)* 0.082(0.03)* 
 
Panel C 




of previous year 
0 0.093[73] -0.024[185] 0.060[154] -0.061[98] 
1 0.123[27] -0.023[59] 0.081[45] -0.056[37] 
Mean Difference -.02925(0.398) -0.001(0.965) -0.021(0.226) -0.005(0.812) 
In order to analyze the relationship between DCA and directors’ competence, the 
samples were separated according to whether the average tenure and other 
directorship of outside directors surpass the sample means. The mean DCA of two 
subsamples are then compared. As shown in Panel A of Table 5, the magnitudes of 
both income-increasing and income-decreasing DCA are smaller for firms in which 
outside directors have longer tenures. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 4 and 
suggests that the outside directors who serve longer on the board are more able to 
constrain earnings management.  
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In Panel B, it can be seen that the board in which outside directors hold more 
directorships is less likely to constrain income-decreasing earnings management 
when the unmanaged earnings is above the previous years earnings. This result 
contradicts Hypothesis 5, which predicts that the number of other directorship is 
negatively related to the level of earnings management, but supports the argument 
that multiple directorships could cause the problem of lack of time. However, the 
differences in the mean DCAs between two subgroups are not significant when the 
unmanaged earnings are compared to zero earnings or when the unmanaged earnings 
are less than the previous year’s earnings.  
 
Table 5 DCA as a function of earnings benchmarks and the directors’ 
competence 
Table 5 reports and compares the means of DCA for sub-samples partitioned by directors’ competence 
variables and earnings benchmarks. D_TENURE is an indicator variable which equals to 1 if the average 
tenure of outside directors is above the sample mean (4.853 years) and zero otherwise. D_DIRSHIP is an 
indicator variable which equals to 1 if the average directorships held by outside directors is above the sample 
mean (2.009), and zero otherwise. 
 
Numbers in the square brackets are the number of observations, and the numbers in the parentheses are t-
statistics.  
* indicates level of significance at 10%. The test of significance is two-tailed. 
** indicates level of significance at 1%. The test of significance is two-tailed. 
Panel A 
D_TENURE UME< zero  UME≥zero 
UME<Earnings of 
previous year 
UME≥ Earnings of 
previous year  
0 0.111[64] -0.031[142] 0.076[119] -0.072[78] 
1 0.083[36] -0.014[101] 0.049[79] -0.042[57] 
Mean Difference 0.028(0.378) -0.017(0.195) 0.027(0.07)* -0.030(0.09)* 
 
Panel B 
D_DIRSHIP UME< zero  UME≥zero 
UME<Earnings of 
previous year 
UME≥ Earnings of 
previous year 
0 0.100[58] -0.019[140] 0.072[109] -0.042[82] 
1 0.103[42] -0.030[104] 0.055[90] -0.087[53] 
Mean Difference -0.003(0.9) 0.011(0.394) 0.017(0.247) 0.045(0.01)** 
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 Since the shareholdings of outside directors measure how much the interests of 
outside directors are aligned with shareholders of the firm, Hypothesis 6 predicts a 
negative relationship between stock ownership of outside directors and the level of 
earnings management. The results shown in Table 6 lend some support to this 
hypothesis. Firms with a higher proportion of outside director holdings have smaller 
discretionary abnormal accruals. The differences are statistically significant when 
unmanaged earnings are below zero and are higher than the earnings of the previous 
year. 
 
Table 6 DCA as a function of earnings benchmarks and the directors’ stock 
ownership 
Table 6 reports and compares the means of DCA for sub-samples partitioned by directors’ stock 
ownership and earnings benchmarks. D_STKOWN=1 if the total shareholding of outside directors is above 
the sample mean (1.467%) and zero otherwise. 
 
Numbers in the square brackets are the number of observations, and the numbers in the parentheses are t-
statistics.  
* indicates level of significance at 10%. The test of significance is two-tailed. 
D_STKOWN UME< zero  UME≥zero 
UME<Earnings of 
previous year 
UME≥ Earnings of 
previous year 
0 0.114[83] -0.027[205] 0.066[169] -0.064[113] 
1 0.038[17] -0.006[39] 0.057[30] -0.036[24] 
Mean Difference 0.076(0.09)* -0.021(0.229) 0.009(0.641) -0.028(0.1)* 
A comparison was made of the means of DCA between the firms holding more than 
8 board meetings per year (mean of variable BRDMEET) and those having fewer 
board meetings. The results are shown below in Table 7. When the unmanaged 
earnings are below the earnings benchmarks, firms with more board meetings per 
annum show smaller income-increasing discretionary current accruals. In the 
situations where unmanaged earnings are above the earnings benchmarks, the 
discretionary current accruals of firms with more board meetings are not 
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 significantly different from those of other firms. In summary, the above results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 7 and indicate that a more active board is more able to 
constrain earnings management, especially when managers have incentives to 
manipulate earnings upwards.  
 
Table 7 DCA as a function of earnings benchmarks and board meeting 
frequency 
 
Table 7 reports and compares the means of DCA for sub-samples partitioned by board meeting frequency and 
earnings benchmarks.8 board meetings per year is the mean value of our sample which is reported in Table 1. 
 
Numbers in the square brackets are the number of observations, and the numbers in the parentheses are t-
statistics.  
* indicates level of significance at 10%. The test of significance is two-tailed. 
 




of previous year 
BRDMEET<8 0.143[36] -0.020[73]  0.086[68] -0.059[39] 
BRDMEET>=8 0.076[47] -0.025[121] 0.049[98] -0.059[65]  
Mean Difference 0.067 (0.05)* 0.005(0.771) 0.037(0.02)* -0.000(0.99) 
5.2.2. Audit Committee Characteristics 
In the above section, the relationship between board characteristics and discretionary 
current accruals was explored by using T-tests, and supporting evidence for some of 
the board characteristics hypotheses was found. In this section, similar tests are used 
to analyze how the audit committee variables are associated with discretionary 
current accruals. Based on hypotheses 8 to 10, it was expected to find that the 
discretionary current accruals would be smaller for firms with an independent audit 
committee, firms with at least one audit committee member having working 




 The results are contrary to expectations.  Panels A and B of Table 8 show no 
statistically significant difference in discretionary current accruals between firms 
with independent audit committees (members with financial expertise) and those 
without. The results in Panel C suggest that firms having more than three audit 
committee meetings (mean value of AUDMEET) per year have smaller income-
decreasing discretionary current accruals when unmanaged earnings are below the 
benchmarks. Thus, while no significant supporting evidence can be found from the 
T-tests for hypotheses 8 and 9, it seems that if audit committees meetings are more 
frequently held, a firm is better able to constrain income-decreasing earnings 
management when unmanaged earnings are above certain benchmarks. This is in 
line with Hypothesis 10.  
 
Table 8 DCA as a function of earnings benchmarks and the audit committee 
characteristics 
Table 8 reports and compares the means of DCA for sub-samples partitioned by board meeting 
frequency and earnings benchmarks. The hypotheses of Panel A, B and C are there are no difference in DCA 
whether the audit committee is independent, whether the committee members have financial expertise or whether 
the audit committee meets more than 3 times a year. 
 
Numbers in the square brackets are the number of observations, and the numbers in the parentheses are t-
statistics.  
* indicates level of significance at 10%. The test of significance is two-tailed. 
 
Panel A: Independence of audit committee 
AUDIND UME< zero  UME≥zero 
UME<Earnings of 
previous year 
UME≥ Earnings of 
previous 
0 0.099[22] -0.019[51] 0.070[38] -0.058[31] 
1 0.102[78] -0.025[193] 0.063[161] -0.059[106] 
Mean Difference -0.001(0.957) 0.006(0.696) 0.007(0.699) 0.001(0.943) 
 
Panel B: Financial expertise of audit committee members 
FIN UME< zero  UME≥zero 
UME<Earnings of 
previous 
UME≥ Earnings of 
previous 
0 0.093[23] -0.034[55] 0.064[44] -0.075[34] 
1 0.103[77] -0.021[189] 0.065[155] -0.054[103] 
Mean Difference -0.010(0.781) -0.013(0.385) -0.001(0.945) -0.021(0.312) 
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 Table 8 (continued) 
Panel C: Audit committee meeting frequency 
AUD_MEET UME< zero  UME≥zero 
UME<Earnings of 
previous 
UME≥ Earnings of 
previous 
AUDMEET>= 3 0.091[52] -0.013[103] 0.071[88] -0.039[63] 
AUDMEET< 3 0.138[18] -0.038[77] 0.055[49] -0.087[44] 
Mean Difference -0.047(0.32) 0.025(0.02)* 0.016(0.32) 0.048(0.02)* 
5. 3. Multivariate Analysis  
In this section, the effects of the board and audit committee on earnings management 
are examined by using regression models. The models were developed in Chapter 4. 
Model 1 examines the relationship between board characteristics and abnormal 
accruals, while Model 2 examines the effects of audit committee variables.  
 
Table 9 tabulates the regression results for Model 1. In the sub-sample where 
unmanaged earnings are less than zero, the coefficient of OUT is significantly 
negative, and this suggests that the proportion of outside directors on the board is 
related to lower discretionary current accruals. The signs for other independent 
variables are consistent with the prior expectations, but none of them are statistically 
significant. Among the control variables, the proportion of managers’ shareholdings 
is inversely related to discretionary current accruals, which is consistent with the 
theory that managerial ownership helps to align the interests of managers with those 
of shareholders. When the unmanaged earnings are above zero, the coefficients of 
independent variables are not significantly different from zero, so the relationships 
between the board variables and the level of earnings management for this situation 
are not supported. Two ownership control variables have significant coefficients. 
Total blockholder ownership increases income-decreasing earnings management 
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 while managerial ownership helps to decrease income-decreasing earnings 
management.  
 
When unmanaged earnings are below the previous year’s earnings, DUAL and 
OTHERBEN are positively related with income-increasing discretionary current 
accruals. These results suggest that the combination of the roles of the chairman and 
the CEO, and compensating outside directors by means other than annual fees and 
meeting fees could decrease the board’s ability to reduce earnings management, and 
provide supporting evidence for Hypotheses 2 and 3. TENURE has a significantly 
negative coefficient, and this result is consistent with Hypothesis 4, i.e., the longer 
the outside directors serve on the board, the more knowledge they accumulate, and 
thus they are better able to constrain earnings management. The results do not 
support Hypothesis 5 and 6, since neither DIRSHIP nor STKOWN% has a 
significant coefficient. However, the signs of STKOWN% are consistent with the 
hypothesis. BRDMEET is negatively related to discretionary current accruals, and 
this result supports Hypothesis 7, i.e., the board meeting is one way to improve the 
board’s monitoring of earnings management. When unmanaged earnings are above 
the previous year’s earnings, there are no significant relationships between board 
variables and the discretionary current accruals. The control variable YEAR has a 
significant and positive coefficient, which may indicate that firms in Year 2002 are 
less likely to manipulate earnings downwards when the UMEs actually exceed the 
previous year’s earnings. 
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 In summary, certain board characteristics are significantly related to discretionary 
current accruals, when the unmanaged earnings fail to meet earnings benchmarks. 
The proportion of outside directors helps to reduce the discretionary current accruals 
when the unmanaged earnings are negative. Board leadership and outside director’s 
compensation are positively related to discretionary current accruals, and the average 
tenure of outside directors and board meetings is negatively associated with 
discretionary current accruals, if unmanaged earnings are below the previous year’s 
earnings. However, no evidence is found of the board’s ability to constrain income-
decreasing earnings management when the unmanaged earnings are above earnings 
benchmarks. 
 
This asymmetric pattern in the board’s monitoring of financial reporting is consistent 
with the results of Peasnell et al (2005), and one possible reason is that the loss 
function of earnings management for board members is asymmetric. The penalties 
(e.g., litigation risks) that board members face for earnings overstatement are very 
likely to exceed that of earnings understatement. Therefore, board members are more 
concerned about income-increasing earnings management. Another explanation 
could be that it is difficult to identify the precise point at which managers will 
manage earnings downward in this thesis. When the unmanaged earnings are equal 
to or just slightly above the benchmark, it is also probable that managers may 
manipulate earnings upwards, instead of adjusting downwards. However, there is 
neither explicit definition of “slightly above benchmark”, nor empirical evidence 
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 documented in the literature of manager’s income-increasing behavior when the firm 
just meet the benchmark. Therefore, no further analysis can be done to test the 
argument. Previous studies report evidence of income-decreasing earnings 
management when accounting-based bonuses of managers are at their maximum 
[Healy (1985) and Gaver et al (1995)]. However, the bonus effect is not within the 
scope of this thesis, and this information is not available for most UK firms since 
there is no explicit requirement for bonus plan parameters to be disclosed. 
 
Table 9 Model 1 Regression results  
Table 9 reports the results of OLS regressions of DCA on board characteristics and a set of control 
variables in subsamples grouped by earnings benchmarks. The sample period covers years 2000 and 
2002. The definitions of the independent variables and control variables are defined in the notes of 
Table 2. 
 
** Indicates level of significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 








of previous year 











(Constant) 0.465** 0.00 -0.024 0.53 0.252* 0.00 -0.101 0.17 
OUT -0.204* 0.08 -0.025 0.59 -0.003 0.88 0.062 0.41 
DUAL 0.036 0.52 0.008 0.61 0.037* 0.09 -0.054 0.15 
OTHERBEN 0.055 0.16 -0.010 0.66 0.033* 0.07 -0.014 0.51 
TENURE -0.006 0.66 0.003 0.17 -0.004* 0.10 0.003 0.50 
DIRSHIP -0.008 0.47 -0.002 0.87 -0.007 0.38 -0.013 0.19 
BRDMEET -0.007 0.20 -0.003 0.40 -0.007* 0.03 -0.001 0.97 
STKOWN% -0.001 0.64 0.002 0.28 -0.000 0.80 0.001 0.75 
Control 
variables         
BRDSIZE -0.012 0.11 0.001 0.66 -0.003 0.28 -0.001 0.44 
BLOCK -0.001 0.45 -0.001* 0.02 -0.001 0.16 -0.001 0.35 
MANOWN -0.003* 0.09 0.001* 0.05 -0.001 0.41 0.001 0.68 
BIG5 0.093 0.30 -0.019 0.52 0.072* 0.10 -0.057 0.35 
LEV -0.110 0.29 0.014 0.73 -0.051 0.23 -0.004 0.71 
SIZE -0.011 0.37 0.004 0.20 -0.017* 0.01 0.012 0.15 
YEAR -0.013 0.70 0.039** 0.00 0.003 0.83 0.061* 0.00 
R-Square 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.20 
F value 1.71* 1.52* 2.33** 1.95* 
Table 10 shows the regression results for Model 2. The audit committee’s 
 66
 independence and committee members’ financial expertise do not have significant 
coefficients in the four regressions, while audit committee meeting frequency has a 
positive relation with the discretionary current accruals for firms with unmanaged 
earnings above the previous year’s earnings. Therefore, the above results do not fully 
support the hypotheses about the relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and the level of earnings management. However, it was found that an 
audit committee which meets more frequently is more able to constrain income-
decreasing discretionary current accruals when the unmanaged earnings exceed the 
previous year’s earnings, which is consistent with Hypothesis 10 and the results in 
the univariate analysis. 
 
Table 10 Model 2 regression results 
Table 10 reports the results of OLS regression of DCA on audit committee characteristics in 
subsamples grouped by earnings benchmarks. The sample period covers years 2000 and 2002. The 
definitions of the independent and control variables are defined in the notes of Table 2. 
 
** Indicates level of significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 







UME< earnings of 
previous year 
UME≥ earnings 










(Constant) 0.283 0.024 -0.071 0.218 0.146 0.009 -0.168 0.043 
INDAUD -0.003 0.922 -0.006 0.681 -0.006 0.739 0.005 0.824 
FIN 0.023 0.533 0.011 0.475 -0.002 0.886 0.009 0.663 
AUDMEET -0.023 0.251 0.006 0.387 0.008 0.259 0.025* 0.035 
Control 
variables         
LEV -0.199* 0.042 0.016 0.698 -0.075* 0.097 -0.016 0.759 
SIZE -0.000 0.981 0.004 0.488 -0.016 0.007 0.011 0.152 
BLOCK -0.003* 0.092 -0.00 0.756 -0.001 0.106 0.001 0.186 
MANOWN -0.001 0.551 0.001 0.157 0.000 0.981 0.000 0.777 
BIG5 0.105 0.257 -0.024 0.580 0.084* 0.054 -0.065 0.268 
D_YEAR -0.016 0.623 0.035* 0.009 -0.001 0.967 0.057* 0.001 
BRDSIZE -0.012* 0.067 -0.000 0.976 -0.003 0.295 -0.003 0.491 
R-Square 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.12 
F value 1.76* 1.363 2.354* 2.553** 
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 While the above results suggest that the independence and financial expertise of the 
audit committee do not appear to affect the level of earnings management, some 
previous papers report that the composition of the audit committee interacts with 
board characteristics. Klein (2002b) finds that the independence of the audit 
committee is positively related to the independence of the board. Beasley and 
Salterio (2001) also report that firms with larger boards, more outside directors, and 
separate CEOs and chairmen have more independent audit committees and include 
more committee members with financial expertise. In order to further analyze the 
effects of the audit committee on monitoring the financial reporting process, Model 3 
was constructed with interaction terms between audit committee characteristics 
(AUDIND, FIN) and board characteristics (OUT, DUAL and BRDSIZE). Control 
variables include those used in Model 2.  The regression results of Model 3 are 
reported in Table 11. The coefficient estimates for control variables are not presented 
as they are not the goal of this study.  
 
The results in Table 11 show that neither the INDAUD (FIN) nor the interaction 
variables have coefficients that are significantly different from zero. Hence, the 
relationship between audit committee independence (financial expertise of 
committee members) and the level of earnings management cannot be found based 
on the sample, even when considering the interaction effects with board 
characteristics. One reason why empirical results are not supportive of Hypotheses 8 
and 9 may be that the AUDIND and FIN are not good measures of independence and 
 68
 financial expertise. Almost 80% of the audit committees in this sample are wholly 
independent and have at least one committee member with accounting or finance 
experience. Thus, it is difficult for the above two variables alone to capture the 
differences in the actual independence and financial knowledge of audit committees 
between firms. The results might be different if some new variables could be 
developed. Another possible reason is that UK firms mainly establish an independent 
and financially experienced audit committee for the purpose of complying with 
requirements. Thus the two variables are not related to the real monitoring ability of 
the audit committee, and there are some missing variables which could determine the 
audit committee effectiveness. 
 
Table 11 Model 3 Regression Results 
Table 11 reports the interaction effects of board characteristics on the association between audit 
committee independence (financial expertise) and earnings management. The regression model is 
shown as below (V1 refers to audit committee independence or Financial expertise): 
εαααααα ++++++= ∑ controlsBRDSIZEVDUALVOUTVVDCA i*1*1*11 43210  
 
** Indicates level of significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 









of previous year 
UME≥ earnings 










INDAUD 0.121 0.47 0.025 0.78 -0.034 0.73 0.144 0.26 
INDAUD*O
UT 0.003 0.99 -0.003 0.98 0.048 0.73 -0.137 0.43 
INDAUD* 
DUAL 0.143 0.30 0.014 0.79 0.102 0.18 0.019 0.87 
INDAUD* 
BRDSIZE -0.014 0.25 -0.004 0.48 -0.001 0.88 -0.007 0.40 
R-Square 0.29 0.10 0.13 0.17 















of previous year 
UME≥ earnings 










FIN 0.185 0.42 0.021 0.80 0.017 0.88 -0.074 0.54 
FIN*OUT 0.069 0.80 -0.073 0.50 0.116 0.38 0.034 0.84 
FIN*DUAL 0.135 0.32 0.027 0.56 0.056 0.33 0.054 0.49 
FIN* 
BRDSIZE -0.023 0.12 0.004 0.55 -0.009 0.24 0.007 0.43 
R-Square 0.30 0.11 0.13 0.19 
F value 2.515** 1.942* 1.954* 1.847* 
 
Since the multicollinearity problem between explanatory variables could lower the 
possible significant relationships between dependent variables and some other 
explanatory variables, the Pearson Correlations between explanatory variables of 
Model 1 and 2 are presented in Table 12 to address this issue. The results show that 
most of the correlation coefficients are less than 0.5 and not significant, except the 
correlation coefficient between board size and firm size, which is 0.523. Therefore, 
the models do not suffer from a severe multicollinearity problem.   
 
We also run the regressions after excluding firm size from the control variables to 
check whether there is any improvement in the results. However, the results are quite 
similar to what have been shown in Table 9 and 10, and thus are not tabulated here. 
The only exception is that the coefficient of board meeting frequency becomes 
significantly negative, when the unmanaged earnings less than zero. This suggests 
that a more active board of directors can reduce the level of earnings management 
which is consistent with Hypothesis 7.  
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 Table 12 Pearson Correlation among explanatory variables 
 
Panel A and B of Table 12 show the Pearson correlation between explanatory variables of Regression Model 1 and Model 2 respectively.  
** Indicates level of significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Indicates level of significance at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
 
Panel A 








OWN BIG5 LEV SIZE 
OUT              
DUAL -0.255**             
OTHER 
BEN 0.180** -0.051            
TENURE -0.000 -0.081 0.184**           
DIRSHIP 0.080 -0.028 0.118* -0.086          
BRD 
MEET -0.139* 0.021 -0.091 -0.022 -0.056         
STK 
OWN 0.156** -0.026 0.153** 0.307** -0.086 -0.050        
BRD 
SIZE 0.055 -0.076 0.149** 0.021 0.049 -0.009 -0.114 *       
BLOCK -0.005 0.044 0.026 0.118 * -0.128 -0.145* 0.224 ** 0.018      
MAN 
OWN -0.184** 0.212** 0.022 -0.028 -0.110 -0.123* -0.009 -0.103 0.397     
BIG5 0.083 0.053 -0.074 0.039 0.071 -0.056 0.032 0.114 0.014 -0.136    
LEV 0.133* -0.036 -0.130 0.047 0.133* -0.022 -0.079 0.150** -0.045 -0.119 0.093   
SIZE 0.106* -0.081 0.040 -0.094 0.186** 0.027 -0.187** 0.523** -0.259 -0.229 0.149 0.198  
YEAR 0.020 -0.066 0.003 0.018 -0.069 -0.146* 0.008 -0.015 0.152 0.016 -0.000 -0.077 0.027 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Panel B 
 BRDSIZE BLOCK MAN OWN BIG5 LEV SIZE YEAR 
IND 
AUD FIN 
BRDSIZE          
BLOCK 0.018         
MAN 
OWN 
-0.103 0.397**        
BIG5 0.114* 0.014 -0.136*       
LEV 0.155** -0.045 -0.119 0.093      
SIZE 0.523** -0..259** -0.229** 0.149** 0.198**     
YEAR -0.015 0..152** 0.016 0.000 -0.077 0.027    
IND 
AUD 
-0.077 -.177**) -0.095 -0.041 -0.005 0.070 0.051   
FIN -0.001 0.098 0.055 -0.002 -0.123* -0.043 0.046 -0.043  
AUDMEET 0.199** -0.019 -0.083 0.040 -0.004 0.292** 0.109 0.035 0.097 
 
5. 4. Additional Analysis   
5.4.1 Big Bath Hypothesis  
 
In the above tests, we take the assumption that the managers will manipulate 
earnings upward (downward) when the unmanaged earnings are below (above) the 
benchmark.  However, Degeorge et al (1999) argue that managers may engage in 
income-decreasing earnings management when the unmanaged earnings are below 
the benchmark by a substantial amount, and this is so called taking “big bath”.   The 
reason of doing so is not only because managers can deter the earnings for future 
periods, but also because it is likely to lower future earnings expectation. Lin and 
Shih (2005) find the empirical evidence of firms with extremely bad operating 
performance taking “big bath”. 
  
Firms with extremely bad performance are selected to test whether the sample firms 
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in this study engage in “big bath”. The firms are ranked by unmanaged earnings and 
difference between unmanaged earnings and last year earnings, and then the lowest 
25% firms are selected to test their mean DCAs. The results are shown in Table 13 
below. 
 
Table 13 Mean of Discretionary Current Accruals for the samples with extreme 
bad performances 
The sample firms are ranked by unmanaged earnings and difference between unmanaged earnings and 
last year earnings, and then the lowest 25% firms are selected to calculate their mean DCAs.  
** Indicates level of significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Indicates level of significance at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
  UME<zero UME<Earnings of previous Year 
Mean DCA  0.186** 0.160** 
P-value  0.001 0.000 
Number of observations 25 51 
 
The results show that the mean DCA are significantly positive, and thus provide no 
indication of the samples in this study to involve in “big bath”. There several 
possible explanations for the results.  One is that managers may prefer smoothing the 
earnings even the firm is a loss position, since “big bath” behavior which normally 
associates with decrease in stock price can make firm become a target of takeover 
actions [Yu (2006)].  Another possible reason is that incidence of “big bath” is 
dependent on other factors, such as whether there is a management change [Peasnell 
et al (2005)].  It also can be explained as because the samples of this study are large 
UK firms, and their performances are relatively stable compared to the whole market. 
Therefore, even for those sample firms with most negative unmanaged earnings or 
largest earnings drop from last year, the magnitude is not so large as to engage in 
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“big bath”.  The results show that the mean DCAs are significantly positive, and thus 
provide no indication of the samples in this study to involve in “big bath”. There 
several possible explanations for the results.  One is that managers may prefer 
smoothing the earnings even when the firm is in a loss position, since “big bath” 
behavior which normally associates with decrease in stock price can make the firm 
become a target of takeover actions [Yu (2006)]. Another possible reason is that 
incidence of “big bath” is dependent on other factors, such as whether there is a 
management change [Peasnell et al (2005)].  It also can be explained as the samples 
of this study are large UK firms, and their performances are relatively stable 
compared to the whole market. Therefore, even for those sample firms with most 
negative unmanaged earnings or largest earnings drop from last year, the magnitude 
is not large enough to engage in “big bath”. 
 
5.4.2 Analyst Forecast as Earnings Benchmark 
 
Besides reporting profit and earnings growth, meeting analyst forecast is another 
important earnings benchmark.  A number of studies document the evidence of 
earnings management to meet analyst forecast [e.g., Degeorge et al (1999); Payne 
and Robb (2000); Matsumoto (2002)]   
 
In this section, analyst forecast is used as benchmark to partition the samples into 
two categories: firms with unmanaged earnings meeting or missing the analyst 
forecast. The forecast data are obtained from I/B/E/S and the consensus analyst 
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forecast is calculated as the mean of all the forecasts of each firm. The regressions 
are then run for Model 1 (the board of directors) and 2 (audit committee) 
respectively. The results are reported in Table 14.  
 
Overall, the results are substantially similar to those using the other two benchmarks.  
TENURE and DIRSHIP have significantly negative coefficients, which support the 
Hypothesis 4 and 5, i.e., the year of directors serving on the board and the number of 
their outside directorships are positively related to their ability to constrain earnings 
management, when managers engage in income-increasing earnings management. 
The coefficients of audit committee variables remain insignificant, consistent with 
test results of the other two benchmarks.  The tests do not have strong powers as we 
can see from the R-square and F value. This may be because the sample sizes reduce 
to 205 and 189 firm-year observations for the regression of characteristics of the 
board of directors and Audit Committee respectively.  
 
Table 14 Model 1 and 2 Regression Results with Analyst Forecast as benchmark 
 
Table 14 reports the results of OLS regression of the DCA on board characteristics and audit 
committee characteristics in subsamples grouped by an earnings benchmark: analyst forecast. 
** Indicates level of significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Indicates level of significance at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 




















(Constant) 0.195** 0.023 -0.004 0.977 0.131* 0.060 -0.109 0.168 
OUT -0.066 0.268 -0.101 0.363     
DUAL 0.019 0.438 0.020 0.829     
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Table 14 (continued) 




















OTHERBEN 0.014 0.467 0.055 0.110     
TENURE -0.005* 0.095 -0.007 0.146     
DIRSHIP -0.014* 0.094 -0.027* 0.080     
BRDMEET -0.003 0.374 -0.002 0.693     
STKOWN% 0.002 0.184 0.001 0.663     
INDAUD     -0.009 0.596 0.000 0.990 
FIN     -0.022 0.229 0.001 0.962 
AUDMEET     0.007 0.414 0.000 0.982 
Control Variables        
BRDSIZE -0.005 0.165 -0.008 0.200 -0.007* 0.060 -0.007 0.263 
BLOCK -0.001* 0.065 0.000 0.567 0.000 0.559 0.000 0.688 
MANOWN 0.000 0.978 -0.001 0.711 0.000 0.937 0.000 0.840 
BIG5 0.081 0.187   0.058 0.249   
LEV -0.010 0.831 0.069 0.398 -0.085* 0.056 -0.015 0.857 
SIZE -0.004 0.577 0.017 0.228 -0.004 0.564 0.011 0.377 
YEAR -0.018 0.212 0.037 0.162 -0.018 0.190 0.053 0.038 
R-Square 0.153 0.235 0.125 0.120 
F Value 1.603* 1.279 1.590* 1.100 
 
5.4.3 Definition of board independence 
As was discussed in Section 2.3.1, outside directors include independent directors 
and “grey directors” who have certain affiliations with the company. In order to 
exclude the effects of the “grey directors”, the board independence was measured by 
using the percentage of independent directors instead of that of outside directors, and 
then re-estimating Model 1. The regression results are shown in Table 12. The results 
do not show major changes for most of the coefficient estimates of the board 
variables, except that the coefficient of the percentage of independent directors 
becomes insignificant when unmanaged earnings are below zero. The relationship 
between tenure and discretionary current accruals becomes to be insignificant when 
the unmanaged earnings fail to exceed the previous year’s earnings.  
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5.4.4 Lack of independence 
There may be a problem of lack of independence for the above tests, because some 
firms may have been included twice for years 2000 and 2002 in the sample. Thus 
further tests for samples which contain firms with only one observation were 
conducted. Since the sample size decreased to 136 observations, the regressions were 
run on the absolute value of discretionary current accruals. The samples were not 
separated based on earnings benchmarks in order to avoid losing more information. 
The results are quite similar to those of the full sample, except that the negative 
coefficient of average tenure became significant while the number of meetings of the 
board became insignificant.  
 
Table 15 Regression results of Model 1: replacing percentage of outside 
directors with percentage of independent directors on the board 
Regression results of DCA on board characteristics are reported. The independence of the board was 
measured by the percentage of independent directors (IND) on board, instead of the percentage of 
outside directors. The other variables are the same as Model 1.  
 
** Indicates level of significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 








of previous year 
UME≥ earnings 










(Constant) 0.430* 0.01 -0.043 0.56 0.248** 0.00 -0.124 0.21 
IND -0.160 0.27 0.013 0.84 0.006 0.92 0.108 0.21 
DUAL 0.044 0.44 0.012 0.62 0.038* 0.10 -0.050 0.18 
OTHERBEN 0.039 0.32 -0.011 0.50 0.033* 0.07 -0.007 0.73 
TENURE -0.006 0.37 0.003 0.15 -0.004 0.11 0.004 0.27 
DIRSHIP -0.006 0.72 -0.002 0.80 -0.007 0.38 -0.014 0.13 
BRDMEET -0.007 0.28 -0.002 0.45 -0.007* 0.04 -0.002 0.67 
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of previous year 
UME≥ earnings 










BRDSIZE -0.011 0.14 0.002 0.63 -0.003 0.37 -0.001 0.88 
BLOCK -0.001 0.33 -0.001* 0.02 -0.001 0.26 0.000 0.56 
MANOWN -0.003* 0.10 0.002* 0.04 -0.001 0.20 0.001 0.27 
BIG5 0.094 0.33 -0.020 0.66 0.072 0.10 -0.059 0.33 
LEV -0.129 0.22 0.011 0.79 -0.052 0.26 -0.001 0.99 
SIZE -0.012 0.34 0.003 0.61 -0.017* 0.01 0.011 0.17 
LOSS -0.089* 0.07 -0.048 0.30 -0.006 0.87 0.031 0.36 
YEAR 0.021 0.56 0.040** 0.00 0.003 0.85 0.062** 0.00 
R-Square 0.19 0.09 0.16 0.20 
F value 1.38 1.51* 2.32** 2.02* 
 
5.4.5 Further analysis of outside directors’ tenure  
According the univariate analysis in section 5.2.1 and regression results in section 
5.3, the average tenure is negatively related to the income-increasing discretionary 
accruals. However some professional publications recommend that outside directors 
should not stay on a board for too long because they may lose their independence 
and be entrenched with managers. Thus the outside directors who serve too long on a 
board may be less able to reduce earnings management.  
 
To address this issue, I divided the sample into two groups and compared their 
DCAs based to whether the average tenure of outside directors is longer than 9 years. 
Although there is no clear definition of “long tenure”, the revised Combine Code 
(2003) does suggest that the outside directors who have served more than 9 years 
should be re-elected annually instead of the usual once every 3 years. Therefore I 
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chose 9 years as the benchmark. The result does not support the above surmise, since 
there is no significant difference between the DCAs of the two groups. 
 
The sample was further divided into four groups based on the percentile of the 
outside directors’ tenure. The DCAs of the four groups are not significantly different 
from each other. However, the magnitudes of both income-increasing and income-
decreasing DCAs of the 3rd quartile group (firms with average outside directors’ 
tenure from 4 to 6 years) are smaller than those of other groups.  Although the 
difference is not statistically significant, it suggests that the relationship between 
outside directors’ tenure and earnings management may not be liner but a U-shape.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The board of directors is an important corporate governance mechanism in 
controlling agency problems between managers and shareholders. Many previous 
studies find a negative relationship between the board monitoring and the occurrence 
of financial reporting violations, thereby supporting the importance of the board’s 
monitoring role on top management. The present study explores whether the same 
relationship also exists between board monitoring and earnings management which 
is a more subtle form of financial reporting distortion. 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between board characteristics and the level of 
earnings management. As a sub-group of the board of directors, the audit committee 
has direct responsibility to oversee the financial reporting process. Therefore, the 
audit committee’s effect on the level of earnings management was also analyzed. 
Unlike prior studies, most of which focus on US firms, this thesis uses samples of 
UK-listed firms because of the UK’s unique institutional environment. For example, 
corporate governance requirements of the UK are less restrictive than those of the 
US, and compliance with the corporate governance codes is voluntary for UK firms. 
This study also examines the effects of board and audit committee monitoring on 
earnings management when unmanaged earnings are below or above earnings 
 80
Chapter 6                                                                                                                          Conclusions 
benchmarks. As the results have been discussed in Chapter 5, the major findings are 
summarized as follows. 
 
First, it was found that firms with a greater proportion of outside directors, those in 
which the CEO and chairman positions are separated, or those in which no extra 
benefits are paid to the outside directors, are associated with less income-increasing 
discretionary current accruals when unmanaged earnings fall below the benchmarks. 
Since the three board characteristics mentioned above are proxies for board 
independence, it is concluded that board independence helps constrain earnings 
management when managers have incentives to manipulate earnings upwards.  
 
Second, the average tenure of outside directors is also negatively related to income-
increasing discretionary current accruals, and this suggests that outside directors who 
serve longer on the board will accumulate more knowledge of the firm and will be 
better able to monitor the management. This is consistent with the results of Beasley 
(1996) and Be’dard et al (2004), but contrary to the recommendation of the revised 
Combined Code (2003) in limiting directors’ tenure.  
 
Third, there is weak evidence that stock ownership of outside directors helpful in 
deterring earnings management. Although most of the results are not significant, 
they suggest the stock ownership might be an effective incentive for outside 
directors working for the interests of shareholders, and thus have some implications 
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for policy makers in designing directors’ remuneration package. 
 
Fourth, board meeting frequency is negatively related to income-increasing 
discretionary current accruals. This result is consistent with prior research such as 
Vefeas (1999) and Xie et al (2003), and supports the idea that an active board is more 
effective in monitoring management.  
 
Fifth, there is no evidence that board characteristics are related to income-decreasing 
earnings management when unmanaged earnings are above the earnings benchmarks. 
This asymmetric behavior pattern of directors may be because the penalties for 
earnings overstatement that directors will face are more severe than those of earnings 
understatement. 
 
Finally, no evidence is found that the audit committee independence and the 
financial expertise of audit committee members are related to the level of earnings 
management. These results are robust even if their interaction effects with the board 
characteristics were controlled. Only the frequency of committee meeting appears to 
help to restrain income-decreasing earnings management when unmanaged earnings 
exceed the benchmark. The insignificant effects of audit committee independence 
and financial expertise may be because the variables used here are not good proxies 
of actual independence and financial expertise. Another alternative explanation could 
be that there are some missing variables, other than independence and financial 
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expertise, which could determine the effectiveness of the audit committee. 
 
This thesis has its own limitations and thus provides several implications for further 
research.  
 
First, this thesis estimates discretionary current accruals by modified Jones model in 
order to be consistent and comparable to prior studies. Many studies argue that there 
is possible misspecification of the model, and provide evidence that abnormal 
accruals are correlated to firms performance [Dechow et al (1995), Kathari et al 
(2005), Ashbaugh et al (2003), Lin and Shih (2005)] Therefore, the results of this 
thesis may be biased. There are some papers which try to control the impact of firm 
performance on discretionary accruals. Some studies include lagged return on assets (ROA) in 
the Jones (modified Jones) model as an additional regressor, such as Ashbaugh et al (2003) and 
Kothari et al (2002). However, Kothari et al (2005) find this method does little to improve the 
specification or the power of the Jones model. Other studies use performance-matched samples 
to estimate adjusted discretionary accruals, but there is no consensus on which firm 
characteristics should be chosen to match. For example, Teoh et al (1998a) match on industry 
and net income, Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) match on industry and size, while Kothari et al 
(2005) match on ROA. Hence, without clear theory guidance on how to identify an appropriate 
control group for the samples in this thesis, no test can be done using the performance matching 
method.. Further development in theory and research design of earnings management 
studies will be able to mitigate this problem. 
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Second, the independence of the audit committee and financial expertise do not have 
significant effects on earnings management in this thesis, and this may be because 
the variables I chose are not good proxies. Future research may attempt to develop 
better measures of audit committee independence and expertise which may produce 
more meaningful results by thoroughly examining audit committee members’ 
backgrounds. Some prior studies have found differences in the behavior of 
committee members, based on different experiences and backgrounds. For instance, 
Xie et al (2003) document negative relationships between the level of earnings 
management and the proportion of directors with corporate executive or investment 
banking backgrounds on an audit committee. Dezoort and Salterio (2001) report that 
audit committee members who have more independent director experience and audit 
knowledge are more likely to support auditors, while committee members who are 
currently managers of the same company are more likely to support the management 
in an auditor-management dispute.  
 
Third, SOX (2002) and the revised Combined Code (2003) require 100% 
independent committee, but many empirical studies can not find fully independent 
audit committees are related to good governance [Defond and Francis (2005)], 
including this thesis. However, some of them do find a higher proportion of 
independent members improve governance. Hence, it is also an interesting research 
opportunity to examine whether 100% independent audit committee or a higher 
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proportion of independent members are more effective in monitoring earnings 
management. 
 
Fourth, future research may elaborate more on the relationship between the outside 
directors’ tenures and earnings management. Most empirical studies try to explore 
their liner association and this thesis also finds that they are negatively related. 
However, the results in additional analysis (section 5.4.3) indicate the actual 
relationship may be a U-shape. Since the results in section 5.4.3 are not statistically 
significant, no further study on this issue was done in this thesis, but they do provide 
an opportunity for future research. 
Fifth, although this thesis presents empirical evidence of relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings management, we should be cautious to interpret 
the relationship as causality.  It is possible that the earnings management and 
corporate governance mechanism are endogenous variables, driven by the same set 
of innate firm characteristics. Endogeneity problem will cause the results of this 
thesis biased.  Larcker and Rusticus (2007) argue that a two-step methodology which 
includes a large set of exogenous economic determinants of the choice variables 
(corporate governance mechanism for this thesis)might solve the endogeneity 
problem. However, without clear theory and the identification of truly exogenous 
determinants, it is very difficult to appropriately apply this methodology.   
 
Finally, the sample firms in this thesis are limited to large firms and the sample 
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period is limited to only two years. Future research could extend the study by 
including firms of smaller sizes as well as data covering a longer sample period. By 
doing so, time-series effects and the effects of size can be further examined. 
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